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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Kalley Rae Aman for the 
Master of Science in Political Science presented June 12, 
1997. 
Title: The Minimal Role of Legal Traditions at the 
International Court of Justice 
International legal scholars and lawyers have 
dedicated much thought and energy to enhancing their 
understanding of how judges at the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) come to decide cases the way they do. 
Although these studies of judicial behavior at the ICJ 
have provided insight into international judicial 
decision-making, still little is known about how 
international judges reach decisions. 
This project was an attempt to improve upon the 
explanations, given thus far, for the decisions made by 
ICJ judges in the cases brought before the Court. In this 
study I tried to ascertain whether and to what extent the 
legal tradition under which an ICJ justice has been 
educated and trained to practice law determines how she or 
he finds and applies the law in an international dispute. 
I also sought to answer the following question: Do the 
civil law and common law traditions differ in enough ways 
or to such a great extent as to render them distinct from 
one another? 
I began by examining the world's three principal 
legal traditions, civil law, common law, and socialist 
law, according to three criteria common to 
macrocomparative surveys on legal tradition: history, the 
conception of law, and the institutional elements of a 
legal system. 
The decisions of three ICJ cases were analyzed with a 
view to determining whether the justices voted along lines 
of legal tradition and/or discovered and applied the law 
in a manner typical of the legal tradition under which 
they were educated. From the analysis I concluded that 
legal tradition was not a significant variable in the 
judicial decision-making at the ICJ. The examination of 
the cases also indicated that the common law and civil law 
traditions appear to converging in so far as they have 
adopted the methods of the other tradition yet still 
diverging as they continue to reveal traditional 
differences. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
For years, legal scholars and others taking an 
interest in law have theorized about how judges make 
decisions. Some have hypothesized that judges rule 
according to their own political or social interests1 , 
others have argued that judges allow only the law and 
relevant legal principles to influence their legal 
reasoning and decision-making in the cases that are 
brought before them. 2 Still, many other writers have 
suggested that it is a combination of factors, including 
the judge's socio-economic background, his or her legal 
education and political and social interests, and her or 
his sense of responsibility to uphold the law that 
contribute to the process of deciding a legal dispute. 3 
Legal scholars and international lawyers have 
dedicated much thought and energy to enhancing their 
understanding of how judges at the International Court of 
Justice come to decide cases the way they do. 4 
Undoubtedly, few would find the reasons for these studies 
surprising. International lawyers, particularly those 
1 
who represent countries with disputes before the Court, 
have an interest in understanding how the justices who 
are deciding the cases will reach a conclusion about the 
facts of the conflict and the law that governs it; the 
better international laV\T}'ers can predict the way justices 
will decide, the greater their hopes of reaching a 
desirable outcome. 
One might suppose also that legal scholars or 
enthusiasts of international law seek knowledge of the 
legal reasoning of ICJ judges so that they may improve 
upon their explanations and predictions of ICJ decisions. 
By gaining insight into the decision-making process at 
the ICJ, scholars and enthusiasts of the law contribute 
to their own pursuit of intellectual development and that 
of the academic community. 
This thesis endeavors to make such a contribution; 
it is an attempt to improve upon the explanations, given 
thus far, for the decisions made by ICJ judges in the 
cases brought before the Court. As stated at the outset, 
many arguments are advanced to explain judicial behavior. 
However, when one looks toward the ICJ, one finds that 
past studies have not shed enough light on the decision-
2 
making process at the ICJ. Little is yet known about how 
international judges reach decisions. 
In this thesis I will try to ascertain if and to 
what extent the legal tradition under which an ICJ 
justice has been educated and trained to practice law 
determines how she or he finds and applies the law in an 
international dispute. This will be accomplished through 
the case study method. I have chosen three cases for 
analysis: The Right of Passage case (India v. Portugal) 5 , 
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Denmark/The 
Netherlands v. Germany) 6 , and The Case Concerning the 
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia) . 7 
These three disputes were chosen from among the 
roughly 76 contentious cases rendered by the ICJ because 
they each represent a period of the Court's activity that 
is distinguishable from the next. Gary Scott and Karen 
Csajko examined the history of the Court's activity and 
found, based on the political and legal landscape since 
the inception of the ICJ, that its history could be 
logically divided into three eras: ICJ I (1946 through 
1962), ICJ II (1963 through 1985) and ICJ III (1986 to 
present) . 8 
3 
These particular cases were chosen from the era they 
represent because the decisions were the most divisive of 
the period. 9 In other words, the decisions in these cases 
were not only split, i.e. dissenting and separate 
opinions were cast, but were widely split with, in some 
cases, the majority of the justices opting out of the 
Court's judgment through separate opinions, declarations, 
or dissents. 
I have chosen to analyze these decisions on the 
basis of legal traditions for two reasons. First, little 
research has been done on the effect that legal education 
and training has on the performance of ICJ justices. 
Lyndell Prott offers a relatively brief investigation of 
the influence of legal education on the judges; however, 
his inquiry extends to only two cases and he chooses 
these because they stand out as examples of this type of 
influence. 10 In this project, I am attempting to improve 
upon Prott's methodology so that I may draw informative 
conclusions about the decision-making at the ICJ. 
Second, it seems that inquiries into other factors 
that are typically cited as significant variables in 
judicial reasoning and decision-making, e.g. socio-
4 
economic background of the judge, political interests, 
and ethical or moral concerns, have not substantially 
improved the understanding of scholars and lawyers on how 
decisions are reached at the ICJ. While much of the 
research on judicial behavior at the ICJ is insightful 
and enlightening, it still appears that not enough is 
known about the process of reaching a judgment at the 
World Court. 11 
I should state at the outset that I do not propose 
to draw grand conclusions about how judges at the ICJ 
reach a judgment. Instead, I will heed the advice of 
experts in the field of judicial behavior who often issue 
warnings about placing too much emphasis on one variable 
or hastily separating one variable in the judicial 
decision-making process from the multitude of potential 
others. One follower of the ICJ states the challenge 
ahead of me nicely: 
Naturally one cannot expect to determine in what 
exact proportion each of these factors has 
influenced the judge's thinking. It would be rash 
in the extreme to try to calculate the exact 
proportion of each element of personal experience on 
a judge's mentality, or to try to discover their 
precise degree of influence on a particular decision 
- such influence being essentially incalculable. 
The aim of this analysis is only to expose these-
factors in the hope that this will create more 
5 
awareness of their influence. 12 
WHAT IS A LEGAL TRADITION? 
Simple observation teaches us that law varies across 
the globe. Legal principles, legal processes, legal 
institutions, and legal structures all differ from one 
political society to the next. 13 The divergence of law and 
legal mechanisms is perhaps most visibly apparent in the 
diversity of regional, national, and municipal laws in 
force throughout the world. 14 
Each sovereign state has, of course, its own 
national legal system. These legal systems are essential 
for the maintenance of order in these states and remain a 
cornerstone of their sovereignty. Within these systems, 
states enact laws and enforce them according to the 
principles and procedures they desire. 
Less observable is what is known as a legal 
tradition. Legal traditions encompass much more than the 
laws and legal machinery of a single state. As we will 
see in the following pages, legal traditions provide the 
broader theoretical framework for the discrete national 
legal systems. More specifically, they embody the 
historical and cultural background within which groups, 
6 
whether states, localities, tribes, or collectivities, 
approach and implement the law. They are, as one 
scholar has nicely put it, 
.. a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned 
attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of 
law in the society and the polity, about the proper 
organization and operation of a legal system, and 
about the way law is or should be made, applied, 
studied, perfected, and taught. The legal tradition 
relates the legal system to the culture of which it 
is a partial expression. It puts the legal system 
into cultural perspective . 15 
A legal tradition, then, 11 is not a set of rules of 
law about contracts, corporations, and er imes, 11 16 rather it 
is a disposition towards law which is influenced and 
informed by the culture in which it operates. It is the 
context under which specific rules of law are made and 
implemented, thus the legal tradition is not only prior 
to the rules about "contracts, corporations, and crimes" 
but, more importantly, it is the theoretical point of 
origin for these laws. 
Craig Lawson offers a schema for simplifying legal 
systems which may also serve as a useful aid for 
understanding the idea of a legal tradition. 17 Using a 
technique which often appears in macrocomparative 
surveys, Lawson identifies four features that are 
7 
commonly used to compare legal traditions. These are 1) 
history; 
2) conception of law; 3) structural elements of the 
formal system of laws; and 4) institutional elements of 
the legal system. 18 Although I will not, at this point, 
proceed to examine each legal tradition according to 
these features, it seems that by providing an explication 
of each of these four features, one might gain a better 
grasp on the notion of a legal tradition. 
1. History: Each legal tradition has its own history, 
that is, the ideas that we hold today towards law are not 
entirely our own. The history of a legal tradition is a 
narrative of the ideas and events that have shaped the 
contemporary legal system. John H. Merryman notes that 
11 law is among other things, an expression of a culture; 
ideas about law are part of the intellectual history of a 
people. 1119 Granted, an exploration into the history of a 
legal tradition may not directly tell us everything we 
need to know about contemporary policies, laws, and legal 
mechanisms,w but it does set the theoretical stage for the 
contemporary legal situation. 
8 
2. A Conception Of Law: The second feature noted above 
is not consciously developed by those who adhere to a 
legal tradition. 21 As Lawson explains, a conception of law 
can be defined as "an underlying set of assumptions about 
the nature of law and its role in organizing social 
life. 1122 It is a fundamental attitude towards law that is 
both "predominant and historically deep-rooted. 1123 The 
conception of law has overarching significance for legal 
systems and those groups and individuals it governs since 
it will "color all the workings of the legal order. 1124 
The remaining two features reflect a concern with 
less abstract aspects of a legal tradition. 
3. The Formal Elements Of A Legal System: This 
typically refers to the individual rules of law in legal 
systems. However, comparatists have found that the 
organization of legal systems into larger groupings on 
the basis of more general and structural elements is more 
practical and, arguably, more valuable than comparing the 
individual rules of a system. 25 "The similarity of rules 
is in most cases an unreliable indicator of the 
9 
convergence or divergence of the legal system," Merryman 
notes. "The rule ordinarily symbolizes far more than its 
bare text states. 1126 Rules do not say anything about 
11 legal extension, legal penetration, legal culture, legal 
structures, legal actors and legal processes. 1127 And as 
Lawson points out, rules and doctrines are "the least 
enduring and most superficial elements of legal systems. 1128 
Brierly agrees, stating that "a system of law is 
something more than merely the sum total of all the rules 
valid in a given country and at any given time. "29 
Grouping legal systems into traditions involves taking 
into consideration 11 constant elements" rather than the 
11 less stable rules found in the law at any given moment. 1130 
Hence, structural elements of legal systems are most 
often chosen for the purposes of macrocomparative study 
of legal traditions; these are considered to be enduring 
elements of a legal system and reflect the continuity of 
law. 31 The following structural elements are most often 
chosen for the purposes of macrocomparative study: the 
major divisions or branches of a body of laws, its 
fundamental or pervasive concepts, and its terminology. 32 
10 
4. The Institutional Elements Of A Legal System: These 
are 11 the animating forces in a legal system. 1133 They 
include the Courts, legislatures, associations of 
lawyers, and other legal processes that can be found 
within the legal structure. 34 In order to learn more about 
a legal tradition, the comparatist might ask what role 
legislatures play in the particular legal systems that 
tradition governs. Or she might make inquiries into the 
part that lawyers and other advocates play in the legal 
systems. 
A legal tradition, then, is a narrative of a 
culture's ideas and attitudes towards law and its role in 
society. These attitudes are reflected in the structure 
of the legal system as well as its institutions. To 
build a legal system, a society must know in advance what 
it wants from the rule of law; it must have formed an 
idea of how law ought to be or is created; it must have a 
conception of the type of relationship its members will 
have with the law; and it must have some notion of how it 
would like to see law implemented and enforced. In 
short, the society must have expectations about the 
11 
functions of the legal system and the principles upon 
which it will operate. 
But these expectations do not appear overnight, in 
fact, they can be traced back to ideas that are hundreds, 
even thousands of years old. It is the history of these 
ideas, and the cultural context within which they are 
developed, which forms the legal tradition and, 
subsequently, the mindset with which a society approaches 
the law. 
LEGAL TRADITIONS AROUND THE WORLD 
There are three principal legal traditions in the 
world today: the civil law tradition, the common law 
tradition and the socialist tradition of law. 35 The civil 
law tradition is the dominant legal tradition in most 
parts of Western Europe, all of Central and South 
America, many parts of Asia and Africa and in a few 
enclaves of the common law world - Quebec, Puerto Rico, 
and Louisiana. 36 The United States, Great Britain, 
Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all adhere to 
the Anglo-Saxon common law tradition. 37 Parts of Asia and 
Africa have also been substantially influenced by the 
12 
common law tradition. 38 The Socialist law tradition 
operates in the states of the former Soviet Union and in 
those Eastern European states that once constituted part 
of the Soviet Bloc.~ 
As we shall see, each of these three traditions is 
of European origin. Merryman explains that they are all 
closely allied to the development of European 
civilization. They express ideas and embody 
institutions which have been formed in the Western 
historical and cultural context.~ 
The civil law and common law traditions in particular 
have developed in a similar historical and cultural 
setting. In fact, some comparatists argue that the 
histories of these two traditions and the conceptions of 
law they hold are so alike that to speak of them as two 
distinct legal traditions is misleading. 41 If this is the 
case, i.e. if the civil and common law traditions are 
really one in the same except for some minor differences, 
then this project is in jeopardy, for most of the judges 
at the ICJ have been educated and trained under a common 
law or civil law system. In other words, if the legal 
traditions do not diverge in ways that might matter to 
13 
the decision-making of justices, then this study seems 
pointless. However, the contention that the civil and 
common law traditions share virtually all of their 
fundamental characteristics and thus should not be 
thought of as two distinct approaches to law is simply 
that - a contention. There are others who argue that the 
traditions diverge in both subtle and explicit ways which 
are reflected in the institutions, processes, and 
structure of the legal systems.~ 
In order to come to any conclusion about the 
similarities or differences between legal traditions, an 
examination of the traditions must be undertaken using a 
defined set of criteria. I will once again borrow the 
criteria used by Lawson in his comparative study of civil 
law and common law legal traditions: history, conception 
of law, structural elements of the formal system of laws, 
and institutional elements of the legal system. 43 Lawson 
explains that the comparison of legal traditions involves 
identifying particular features: 
One must find a taxonomy which compares fundamental 
features - those which are more likely to be 
enduring and widely dispersed - and features which 
broadly represent the range of laws and institutions 
within a legal system.« 
14 
The four features proposed by Lawson are useful tools for 
analysis; they provide enough generality to make possible 
a comparison of what are potentially very diverse legal 
traditions yet they establish fairly clear guidelines for 
determining what can or cannot be incorporated into the 
analysis. 45 In other words, comparison based on the four 
features alone allows for manageability over a wealth of 
information some of which is relevant to the analysis and 
some of it not. These features appear to be relevant to 
the purpose of this project, i.e. determining the 
influence of legal tradition on judicial decision-making 
at the ICJ, for two reasons. First, they comprise what 
are the enduring and fundamental features of a legal 
tradition. As discussed above, comparatists agree that 
an attempt at comparison of legal traditions based on 
changing and unstable elements, for instance the 
individual rules of legal systems, fails to satisfy the 
standards of comparative scholarship. 46 Second, 
application of the set of criteria proposed by Lawson to 
this project makes it a manageable endeavor. 
In my own analysis I will, however, omit the third 
feature, structural elements of the formal system of 
15 
laws. As discussed above, comparatists discourage 
drawing conclusions about legal traditions or legal 
systems from a comparison of the particular rules of a 
legal system. They argue that a more fruitful endeavor 
would take into account the structural features of the 
system. But it seems that for the purpose of this 
thesis, an exploration into structural features is 
unnecessary; an analysis of the traditions based on the 
other three features will suffice. 
From the examination of the traditions we can 
hopefully begin to find answers to two questions. First, 
do the traditions differ in enough ways or to such a 
great extent as to render them distinct from one another? 
Second, do the legal decisions at the ICJ reflect a 
commitment to the principles and procedures of a legal 
tradition and if so can legal education and training of 
justices greatly enhance one's power to explain and 
predict judicial decision-making at the ICJ? 
Before turning to an examination of the civil law, 
common law, and socialist law traditions, I would like to 
point out that these are not the only legal traditions 
represented throughout the world. Other major religious 
16 
and nonwestern legal traditions include Islamic law, 
Hindu law, Jewish law, Chinese and Japanese (and Korean) 
law, and the variety of indigenous African legal 
traditions usually summed up as African customary or 
tribal law. 47 Although these nonwestern legal traditions 
are of equal importance to the international legal 
community and the ICJ as the Western legal traditions, 
they will not be included in this study. This 
examination will encompass only civil law, common law, 
and socialist law as the justices that have sat at the 
ICJ have overwhelmingly been educated and trained under 
one of the three Western legal traditions. 
Finally, one caveat will be issued before proceeding 
to the discussion of the legal traditions. Setting aside 
for the moment the question of whether or not the legal 
traditions are truly distinct from one another, one must 
still show caution when trying to place ideas, concepts, 
institutions, structures, etc. into categories. 
Taxonomies are useful for the purposes of explaining 
phenomena; however, they do not exist apart from our 
conception of that phenomena. Legal traditions, then, 
are a theoretical construct; they represent the scholar's 
17 
need to organize and understand phenomena. In fact, 
there is no such thing as the civil law system, 
the common law system, or the socialist law system. 
Rather, there are many different legal systems 
within each of these three groups or families of 
legal systems. But the fact that different legal 
systems are grouped together under such a rubric 
as "civil law," for example, indicates that 
they have something in common, something that 
distinguishes them from legal systems classified 
as "common law" or "socialist law. " 48 
It is to these commonalties between and among legal 




THE THREE PRINCIPAL LEGAL TRADITIONS: 
CIVIL LAW, COMMON LAW, & SOCIALIST LAW 
The student making a comparison of the 
methods of legal thinking in the common 
law and the civil law must be constantly 
on his guard against one-sided views, 
for they are too easily adopted by the 
superficial observer in this area. 49 
THE CIVIL LAW 
The civil law tradition is the oldest of the three 
principal legal traditions; it can be traced back to 
Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis of the sixth century 
A.D.~ In an effort to reclaim and reorganize the Roman 
legal system, the Roman Emperor Justinian prepared an 
authoritative text on the Roman Civil Law. Although the 
Corpus Juris Civilis was influential during the existence 
of the Roman Empire, after the empire's dissolution it 
fell into disuse until the renaissance of the 11th and 
19 
12th centuries. Thus, the birth of the civil law 
tradition is typically considered to have been in the 
middle ages with the revival of the Corpus Juris Civilis 
by the legal scholars of the Renaissance. 
The Corpus Juris Civilis became the primary subject 
of study at the Italian legal universities, including 
Bologna. Merryman offers two reasons for the Italians' 
fascination with Justinian's compilations. First, the 
Renaissance was marked by a heightened interest in the 
Holy Roman Empire. 51 Since the Corpus Juris Civilis was 
written by a Holy Roman Emperor, it was thought of as 
"imperial legislation" conferred upon the people by the 
authority of both the pope and the emperor. 52 Second, with 
the renewed faith in the potential of reason, the twelfth 
century Italians hailed the Corpus Juris Civilis as a 
piece of "written reason", a work of intellect superior 
to the laws established by the barbaric Germans. 53 The 
prominence of the Corpus Juris Civilis rose as the legal 
universities of Bologna and other Italian cities became 
the foremost institutions for legal study. 54 As men from 
all of Europe flocked to the Italian universities to 
study law and then returned home to practice it, the 
20 
Corpus soon evolved into a body of law common among the 
European nations. 
Although the jus commune, as it is known, was not a 
uniform body of law applicable to all of the nations of 
Europe, it was similar to the law of the Holy Roman 
Empire in that it was created to overcome the diversities 
across the continent." It intended to provide jurists 
with a common language and method which oriented them in 
the search for just solutions.~ As Rogowski phrases it, 
"the civil law is not a distinct field of law, but an 
umbrella concept for legal cultures on the European 
continent .. 1157 
The development of the jus commune was greatly 
affected by the events that unfolded in European society 
in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The predominance 
of Justinian's text diminished as the intellectual 
revolution that framed the American and French 
revolutions made its mark on the civil law. 
The influence of the Enlightenment on the 
development of the jus commune is apparent in changes 
such as the glorification of the secular state, the 
exaggerated emphasis on private property and liberty of 
21 
contract, the abolition of feudal obligations and 
relationships, and nationalism. 58 The new found principles 
of equality of persons and natural rights to property, 
liberty and life reflect the enlightenment preoccupation 
with secular natural law. 59 The fear of government 
instilled by this movement and its valorization of 
personal liberties is manifested in the principle of 
separation of powers and, in France, in the limiting of 
the role and power of the judiciary.~ Finally, the 
rationalism prevalent in 18th century Europe is evidenced 
in the codification of civil law into a "coherent, 
systematic form. "61 
The nineteenth century witnessed a fragmentation of 
the civil law, with the European states making national 
law exclusive to their own states. The civil codes 
formulated by the European states, particularly France, 
embodied principal concepts from Roman civil law. To 
this day, the sovereign states of Europe have distinct 
national legal systems. Nonetheless, the influence of 
the jus commune is, according to some scholars, 
undeniable: 
22 
But what binds such nations together is that 
these indigenous legal institutions have been 
combined with the form and substance of Roman 
civil law, under the influence of the jus 
commune. The Roman influence is very great; 
the native legal contribution, while substantial, 
is generally of subsidiary importance. It does 
not go to such matters as basic legal attitudes 
and notions, or to the organization and style 
of the legal order. These are drawn from the 
older, more fully developed and sophisticated 
Roman civil law tradition. 62 
According to this view, the law of the individual 
European states is first, a product of jus commune and 
second, a creation of each of the states. 
CONCEPTION OF THE LAW 
As the historical survey indicated, the civil law 
tradition was born out of the Renaissance scholars' 
interest in an authoritative rule of law based on reason. 
It was later reborn out of the Enlightenment thinkers' 
excitement about natural law, the idea of equality of 
persons, and again, reason. Because of the persistent 
commitment to principle and the human capacity to reason 
evidenced in the history of the civil law, it should come 
as no surprise that civil law lawyers and scholars have 
historically placed great faith in abstraction. 63 
23 
Law is, in the civil law world, a theoretical 
enterprise and hence is often referred to as a "law of 
scholars. 1164 Law is conceived of as a rational process; 
logical, rigid and clear. 65 The codes embody this process, 
they represent an attempt to "rationalize the answers and 
anticipate legal problems before they arise. 1166 The codes 
manifest the civilian lawyers' conception of law, they 
are "the materialization of a legal philosophy" and a 
"solidification of society's ever changing morals into a 
fixed set of rules. 1167 The code, then, 
is a construction of the mind designed to 
impose a rational and well defined legal 
order on a particular society ... what you 
have is a snapshot, a frozen moment in 
time, of your rights and obligations as 
they apply to you and to your relations 
with others and with society. 68 
Civil law reasoning is deductive. From the 
materials of law {statutes, regulations, etc.) the 
civilian lawyer deduces universal, inherent principles 
and relationships. The legal process in civil law 
countries is syllogistic; as one lawyer has noticed, 
civilian law lawyers engage in what he calls "drawer 
methodology. 1169 When thinking through a legal problem, one 
element of reason leads logically to another and so forth 
24 
until the answer is found in the appropriate code. 70 The 
process of legal reasoning is similar to pulling drawers, 
one by one, until one drawer contains the answer to the 
problem. 71 
The civilian lawyer is not searching for the drawer 
with the best answer. She or he is on a quest for the 
right answer. 72 In civil law, the lawyers do not search 
for a partisan agreement, instead they search for the 
general rule that governs the factual situation at issue. 73 
Each adjudication involves the application of some 
interpretation of the code to a particular set of facts. 74 
Hence, the facts play a subsidiary role to the rule. 
In fact, the codes are intended to be fully comprehensive 
so that the facts of the case don't preclude a rational 
resolution: 
legal technique involves the interpretation 
of statutory texts, analysis of concrete 
problems so as to "fit them into the system" 
conceptually. 75 
It is assumed in the civil law world that the written 
codes contain the answer to a dispute and the goal of 
those in the legal process is to find the answer that, on 
principle, is the right one. Indeed justice requires 
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that the civilian lawyer seek to refer facts back to 
supposed universal principles. 
INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A LOOK AT 
LEGAL EDUCATION & TRAINING AND THE ROLE OF JUDGES 
Legal Education: 
What is perhaps most surprising to the common law 
observer is that legal education in the civil law world 
is a general education at an undergraduate university. 76 
This observation is not unimportant, however, for as will 
be shown, the different contexts for earning a law degree 
in common law and civil law countries signify even 
greater differences between legal education under these 
two traditions. 
Glendon, Gordon and Osakwe point out that the 
greatest divergence in the legal education of these two 
traditions appears in the manner in which the student is 
initiated into the study of law. Mirjan Damaska 
identifies three enduring features of a continental legal 
education: instruction in the grammar of law, a 
presentation of the most important fields of law, and 
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training in legal reasoning. 77 
The instruction in the grammar of law involves the 
analysis of legal concepts followed by the creation of 
more general concepts and then a study of the 
relationship of these concepts. 78 It is a "step by step 
conceptual digestion of the law that results in a network 
of precise interrelated concepts, broad principles and 
classificatory ideas. 1179 
The panoramic presentation of the most important 
fields of law, the second feature of legal education in 
civil law countries, emphasizes not particular legal 
facts but the abstract legal issues that worry civilian 
lawyers and scholars. Because the civil law legal 
education is set in a general university and is 
considered more of a general education than a 
professional education, it is also more academic than 
practice-oriented. Instruction is more philosophic in 
nature and less concerned with practical legal problems 
and resolutions. 80 Students are introduced to the study of 
law through a "systematic overview of the framework of 
the entire legal system. 1181 
Generally, instructors tend to be more concerned 
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with substantive knowledge and information than 
procedural questions. 82 Lecture is the primary method of 
teaching law and class materials usually consist of 
treatises and codes. 83 To the professor, a student's 
sensitivity towards logical consistency over wide areas 
of the law is an indication of a good lawyer in the 
future.u Law is regarded, in varying degrees, as a 
science with the professor knowing the truth and 
imparting it to the students. 85 
Students are taught patterns of legal reasoning 
which correspond to the conception of law that 
predominates in civil law legal systems. In the United 
States we have developed the phrase 11 to think like a 
lawyer 11 to refer to a type of approach to a problem. 
This phrase does not carry the same connotation in civil 
law countries. Students are taught not to problem-solve 
and develop the best argument but to look for the correct 
answer to the legal problem. 86 They are not instructed in 
the art of argumentation; they are educated to reason 
through the problem for its logical conclusion. 
Merryman notes that the principal object of 
scholarship in the civil law tradition is to build a 
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science or theory of law. 87 The legal education in civil 
law societies is reflective of that objective. As 
Damaska observes, the lawyer educated on the continent 
will see this objective betrayed with an emphasis on 
factual questions and too much concern about justice in a 
given case. 88 Thus, the practice of law is downplayed 
during one's legal education and a comprehensive 
understanding of the legal system and the principles upon 
which it is founded are emphasized. 89 
Upon graduation, the law graduate in a civil law 
system has a number of options. However if she or he 
chooses to enter the legal profession as an attorney, 
more practical training will be required. 90 Legal 
education on the continent is not intended to prepare 
students for life as a lawyer. As was pointed out in the 
examination, civil law is a "law of scholars 11 and the 
legal education at the university perpetuates that 
conception. 
Role Of Judges: 
Traditionally, the part that judges play in civil 
law societies has been minimal in comparison with other 
legal traditions. 91 The position has historically been a 
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bureaucratic one offering little flexibility or 
creativity for its holders.~ The civil law judge is 
thought of as a civil servant with the duty of applying 
the appropriate legislation to a legal conflict. 93 She or 
he is part of a professional judiciary and is treated 
with the same respect as other public servants.~ 
A career in the professional judiciary can begin as 
soon as one graduates from law school. 95 The process of 
becoming a judge is relatively uncomplicated: one applies 
for the position, takes state examinations, and, assuming 
the application is accepted and the exams passed, becomes 
a judge.% Before long, she or he will be deciding minor 
cases. 97 
In civil law societies, judicial decision has 
involved little more than the application of a particular 
written rule of law to the facts. 98 Thus the power of the 
judge to influence the development of law has been 
virtually absent. In fact, in civil law legal systems 
judges are almost anonymous. 99 Working within a legal 
tradition which valorizes the legal theory of scholars, 
civil law judges look to the writings of academics for 
arriving at decisions. 100 Academics interpret the law and 
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judges, when adjudicating a dispute, look to these 
interpretations and apply them accordingly. 101 The 
authority to apply precedent to a pending legal dispute 
is given to the judge only after the principles in the 
precedent have "hardened into customary law. 11102 
Judgments on the continent are not personalized and 
are rarely divided. As Zweigert and Kotz explain, 
judgments 
should primarily be impersonal acts of state 
which parade the majesty of the law in front 
of citizens in awe of authority . 103 
I 
The continental judge is'. discouraged from writing 
dissenting opinions. 104 The judgment of the civil law 
court is considered authoritative, unquestionable, and 
final . 105 Because each legal problem is supposed to have 
one right answer, civil law societies value unanimous 
court decisions. Hohmann notes that there is a 
reluctance in civil law countries to think of courts as 
"participants in an ongoing debate 11 about legal problems 
and their solutions. 106 He explains that the civil law 
style is for decisions to flow from an impersonal, 
unified authority . 107 
According to Merryman, the process of judicial 
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decision can be fit into a formal syllogism of scholastic 
logic . 108 The code contains the major premise, the facts 
of the case serve as the minor premise, and the 
conclusion follows from the two.m As he sees it, the 
civil law judge is "an operator of a machine designed and 
built by legislators" 110 ; she or he applies what others 
create. The others, Merryman argues, are the legislators 
whose names we recognize (Justinian and Napoleon) and 
scholars whose works we might have read (Gaius, Irnerius, 
Bartolus, Mancini, Edomat, Pothier, Savigny) .m Judges in 
civil law countries have not enjoyed the same status as 
these historic figures nor have they left a comparable 
legacy in the civil law tradition. 112 
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 
HISTORY 
One third of the earth's population lives in a 
region where common law has made its mark. 113 The 
influence of common law is found in former British 
colonies: The United States, Australia, Canada, India, 
Pakistan, South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Gambia, Liberia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. 114 
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The origin of the common Law tradition is typically 
traced back to A.D. 1066, the date of the Norman Invasion 
when William I defeated the Anglo-Saxons in the Battle of 
Hastings. 1~ David and Brierly note, however, that it is 
not the actual act of conquest itself that altered the 
history of English Law. 116 Instead, it was the strong, 
centralized, and experienced administrative organization, 
the 11 feudal pyramid 11 brought with the foreign occupation 
that forever changed the course of the Anglo-Saxon legal 
tradition. 117 
In connection with the increase in royal power in 
England that began with the reign of William I, the royal 
courts of justice became vested with an unprecedented 
ran~e of jurisdiction which eventually included all of 
England. 118 The king found that through an increase in the 
voltlme of disputes decided by the royal judiciary, he 
could increase profits for the kingdom, as litigants had 
to pay court fees, while extending his power and 
authority throughout the territory. 119 Empowered by the 
King, this handful of royal courts with absolute 
jurisdiction developed, through their rulings, new 
procedures and new substantive law applicable to all 
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Englishmen. 120 This set of rules and laws came to be known 
as the common law. 
During what is known as the "Age of Reform", 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham called for changes in the 
common law system. 121 By the nineteenth century, the court 
system in England had become disorganized with courts 
claiming overlapping jurisdiction . 122 This disorganization 
posed a major problem to the English legal system as it 
was the judicial decisions, not legislation, which served 
as the primary, and at that point in history the only 
source of law. The reform resulted in a transformation 
of the court system in England. A hierarchy of courts 
was established and jurisdiction was divided among them 
on the basis of particular areas of law. 123 
As the nineteenth century approached its end, 
several pieces of legislation were enacted in England 
which covered specific areas of commercial law. 1~ These 
"codifying statutes" were not comprehensive codes or 
regulations embodying societal values. Rather, they were 
"orderly presentations of existing rules which had been 
developed by the courts of common law. 11125 The legislation 
represented in written form the precedents set by the 
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courts. 
To this day there is no comprehensive codification 
of family law or the law of succession, law of contract 
or law of torts in England. 126 The decisions of Courts 
remain the primary source of law. Historically, the 
legislation that has been promulgated has dealt with very 
specific questions rather than comprehensive areas of 
law. 127 Further, these statutes are not revolutionary: 
these statutes can only be understood against 
the background of the unwritten common law, 
for they use the concepts and categories 
and invariably presuppose the rights and 
doctrines which have been developed by the 
Courts." 
Like the states operating under the civil law 
tradition, those countries besides England that adhere to 
the common law tradition have put their own mark on their 
legal system. Although the English have historically 
demonstrated a distaste for law based on legislation, 
some common law countries, such as the United States rely 
on both case law and statutes as their sources of law. 
Nonetheless, case law still takes precedence over 
legislation as the judges in the United States have the 
authority to strike down legislation that runs counter to 
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the Constitution or to judicial precedent. 
Like the civil law tradition, then, the common law 
is a type of jus commune that sets the parameters for how 
a legal system which operates under its principles and 
procedures can be constructed. 
CONCEPTION OF LAW 
As one comparatist has observed, the transition 
from Roman law to English law represents the realization 
by humans that we have limitations and are incapable of 
answering the philosophical questions posed by Plato. 
The common law embodies this resignation and its 
followers, instead of asking "What is justice?" and 
striving to create law that manifests the answer, seek to 
find the best possible solution for each dispute.rn 
The principles of individualism and liberty stand 
out as foundational to the common law project . 129 Common 
law favors rights rather than dut~es, emancipation rather 
than control and responsibility rather than paternalism. 130 
Common law is valorized for its liberal spirit: 
Englislunen have thought of the Common Law 
as being the essential guarantee of freedom, 
serving to protect the citizen against the 
arbitrary inroads of absolute authority, 
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a function of which on the continent is 
performed by the Constitution. 131 
Ironic as it may seem, the legal tradition that 
originated under a powerful monarchy and gives 
extraordinary power to judges to make law, is highly 
suspicious of authority. Common law follows from the 
notion that individuals have a right to contract freely 
and to procure property free from government intrusion. 132 
The aim of common law has not been to craft a 
comprehensive legal theory. Since its inception, the 
goal of common law actors has been to develop a 
procedural network whereby discrete disputes between 
conflicting interests could be resolved. 133 Common law has 
historically been seen as being dominated by "procedural 
thinking" and, as was pointed out above, concerns about 
substantive law have been minimal compared to civil law 
countries. In fact, common law judges in England have 
shown to be disdainful of social legislation. 134 In their 
eyes, social change is to be effected through court 
decisions. 135 
Although the aversion for legislation displayed by 
other common law states may not be as vehement as 
England's, the United States, Canada, Australia and the 
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others still rely on precedent as the primary source of 
law. 136 In these legal systems, the focus is on the facts 
surrounding a particular dispute and the precedents are 
categorized on the basis of such facts.m Precedents are 
the substance of analysis in common law legal systems and 
law is of ten found through a knowledge of the facts of 
cases. 13s A lawyer or judge who wants to find out what 
the law is on a particular matter looks for cases with 
similar facts and determines what the court said, and 
thus what precedent has been established. 139 
So unlike its counterpart on the continent, the 
common law tradition does not value law for its clarity, 
its logic, or for its conformity with standards of 
rationality. Law is not always clear in the common law 
world as it must be interpreted from court decisions 
which, even when dealing with what appear to be similar 
sets of facts, may contradict one another or apply 
different reasoning. Further complication arises out of 
the reliance on the facts of the case. Since each case 
is unique but may share similar circumstances with 
/ 
another, it becomes difficult to decide which cases are 
analogous to one another. The inevitable result of this 
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process is disagreement in the legal community over how a 
court decision ought to be interpreted, conflicting ideas 
about which precedents are applicable to which cases, and 
most importantly, different ideas of what the law truly 
is. 
Hence, in common law legal systems, law is conceived 
of as an exercise in argument with the best position 
becoming law. This is not to say that law in common law 
states is devoid of principle. The principles structure 
the parameters for argument and indeed often form the 
substance of it. As was noted above, the liberty of the 
individual is one principle that is presupposed in common 
law legal systems. Still, common law values the quest 
for practical solutions to practical problems encountered 
by free individuals; it is in this sense pragmatic. 140 It 
does seek nor does it consider possible the quest for 




INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A LOOK AT 
LEGAL EDUCATION & TRAINING AND THE ROLE OF JUDGES 
Legal Education: 
As we have already observed, a civil law legal 
education is offered at the undergraduate university. In 
common law societies, the path to earning a law degree is 
quite different. A law degree is earned in common law 
societies by attending a law school - an independent 
institute of higher education. A juris doctoris is a 
graduate degree which is earned after one is awarded an 
undergraduate degree at a four-year university. A legal 
education is treated not as a general education but as·a 
professional education that prepares the student for 
legal practice. 141 
Upon entering law school, a student of the common 
law is typically instructed to read cases while paying 
close attention to the facts . 142 Students are taught to 
examine the facts with a view to identifying the 
pertinent legal issues in the case.~ After discovering 
all of the legal issues, they are to determine what 
precedent was established in the case and finally, they 
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are taught how to analyze it. 1« This is the common law 
process of legal reasoning. 
As one can see, legal reasoning in the common law is 
an inductive process. The law student begins with the 
specific facts to arrive at the general conclusion. 1~ The 
facts direct students and practitioners to the law which 
is most often found in law reports. Though the process 
has its own logic, it is not logical and rigid in the 
sense that the law is in the civil law world. The 
precedents do not necessarily follow from the facts; as 
stated earlier, one often finds conflicting precedents by 
courts dealing with analogous factual situations. 
Students of the common law are taught to be 
pragmatic. They learn to ask, "What did we do last time? 11 
when searching for the law on a given issue. The 
classroom is more interactive than in the civil law 
societies; there are typically fewer students in each 
class and professors generally expect each student to 
participate in class discussion. 146 
Since the common law is not considered a 11 law of 
scholars 11 and is more often viewed as a 11 law of lawyers 11 , 
the professors and the lectures that they deliver are not 
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valorized to the extent that they are in the civil law. 
Law in these societies is made by court decisions and, as 
many argue, lawyers. While many scholars are lawyers, 
their words are not perceived as creative of law as are 
the words of the judges or lawyers. Moreover, as was 
previously pointed out, professors most often teach the 
law by analyzing the work of legal practitioners and 
reading case decisions. It is less often that law school 
courses stress an academic orientation towards law. 
Because of the emphasis on the resolution of 
concrete, contemporary problems, the student with an 
acute ability for finding legal solutions to current 
conflicts is sure to succeed at law school. By acquiring 
the analytic skills essential to common law legal 
reasoning and applying them to concrete problems he or 
she is becoming prepared to practice law. That is 
precisely what a common law legal education aims to do -
educate students about the law and train them to practice 
it. 
Role of the Judge: 
One comparatist has remarked that the common law 
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judge is 11 the oracle of the law. 11147 Another has referred 
to common law judges as somewhat of a 11 culture hero", 
even a 11 father figure 11 • 148 These phrases and comparisons 
indicate that the common law judge is an influential 
figure in the legal system. 
Indeed the common law judge is often a well-known 
figure. She or he usually has had a successful career as 
an attorney and is regarded highly among her or his 
colleagues. 149 Appointment to the bench varies from state 
to state, however the appointee is typically a highly 
competent and experienced legal practitioner. 150 Once 
appointed to the bench, common law judges, particularly 
those in England, find themselves in an astonishing 
position in both the legal system and society . 151 They 
enjoy a relatively high degree of independence from both 
the other limbs of the government and their fellow 
judges. 152 The common law judges are encouraged to think 
for themselves and to deliver their own opinions, 
concurring or dissenting, in the event that they find the 
unsatisfactory the judgment delivered by the majority of 
the court. These separate and dissenting opinions are 
valuable because they have the potential, with the 
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changes in society or in a court's composition, to become 
law in the future. 
In a common law legal system law develops with court 
decisions; common law essentially means the law created 
and molded by judges. 153 It is conceivable that what is 
law today may be replaced by a new law tomorrow. 154 The 
role of common law judges is not only interpretive but 
creative. In common law'countries like the United States 
where codes have been developed and a constitution is in 
place, the judges are often asked to interpret the 
written documents. However, what is often referred to as 
an interpretation of law becomes creative of law as 
judges decide what vague or ambiguous legislation means. 155 
Common law judges create the law by first, resolving a 
question that arises from a specific factual situation 
and second, making their decision binding on future cases 
with similar sets of facts. 156 
As statutes in common law states are typically 
narrow and directed towards simplistic matters, common 
law judges attach lower value to them. 157 Precedents, on 
the other hand, represent the materials of argument and 
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it is to them that lawyers and judges typically look to 
for law. 
ARE THE CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS CONVERGING? 
I began this chapter with a quotation about the 
danger of taking one-sided views when comparing methods 
of legal thinking. One might argue that I failed to heed 
my own advice in the foregoing discussion of the two 
dominant legal traditions. However, as I stated in the 
introduction, the presentation of the traditions intended 
to highlight those features that are enduring and that 
make the traditions distinct from one another. As in any 
comparison of this kind, one must take ipto consideration 
that there are anomalies in each system and that 
transformations in society may affect transformations in 
the legal systems and ultimately the legal traditions. 
Thus there are few absolutes in either of the legal 
traditions. 
Recently, a controversy has been sparked by those 
who contend that the civil law and common law legal 
traditions are not as divergent as was once believed.w 
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These individuals argue that the distinction made between 
the two traditions regarding the reliance on case law 
versus codes is no longer relevant. They cite an 
expansion of the function of judges in civil law 
societies as evidence for the convergence: 
As legislators are becoming overtaxed by 
the novel problems in life and the civil 
and commercial codes on the Continent grow 
more out-dated, these countries are more 
and more turning to case-law to resolve 
disputes. 159 
On the other hand, common law states appear to be moving 
in the opposite direction. Zweigert and Kotz note that 
these states are increasingly looking to legislators to 
deal with questions that are obscured by case law. 160 
Garner observes that on the matter of the sources of law, 
common law and civil law societies 11 are not so diverse as 
may prima facie appear. 11161 Finally, Aldisert notices that 
the United States has borrowed from the civil law 
tradition the reliance on ~odes and statutes as sources 
of law. 162 
Craig Lawson argues that the similarities go even 
deeper than the case law/code distinction. He maintains 
that civil law and common law states both developed out 
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of Western conception of law and hence share ideas about 
the place of law in the social order, the form of law, 
the application of law, and the substance of law. 163 He 
points out that both the civil and common law traditions 
view minimum interference with individual freedom as the 
single greatest object of the rule of law. Individualism 
and liberty are cardinal principles of both common and 
civil law thought, hence the interests and needs of the 
free individual are favored over those of the larger 
group. 164 Lawson further observes that law occupies a 
primary place in the social order in both legal 
traditions and applies equally to all persons regardless 
of their race, color, gender, ethnicity, etc. 165 
Finally, the two traditions share fundamental legal 
concepts including consent, obligation, rights, person, 
fact, exception, interest, and so on. 166 Lawson's 
observations lead him to conclude that the two 
traditions, common law and civil law, should be thought 
of as related members of a larger Western liberal 
democratic traditions. 167 The common law and civil law 
legal traditions share important fundamental concepts and 
practices yet are distinct families within the larger 
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tradition of Western legalism. 
Merryman agrees that there are similarities between 
the common law and the civil law about the conception of 
law but believes that they have a more recent origin. 168 
He argues that developments in national and regional 
legal systems illustrate 11 a growing consensus about the 
law's proper extension within the society 11 and indicate 
11 an increasingly common legal culture - a broader sharing 
of basic attitudes about the nature of law and the proper 
design and operation of the legal system. 11169 As he sees 
it, the interests of states have begun to converge and in 
this process, states have agreed that law is the proper 
mechanism for protecting or advancing those shared 
interests. As law becomes more universal, the 
differences between common law and civil law begin to 
fade. 
Glendon points out that changes are occurring in the 
legal education of the two traditions as law schools and 
universities try to establish a better balance between 
theory and practice. 170 She presents an argument in 
support of the claim that convergence in legal education 
will eventually affect convergence between legal 
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traditions. 171 
While these observations would likely heighten one's 
doubts about the divergence of the common law and civil 
law traditions, it is equally important to point out that 
each of these scholars recognizes the enduring and 
significant differences between the two traditions. 
Merryman, for instance, sees the convergence of state 
interests and the common and civil law legal systems as 
threatened by an increasing divergence on the 
international scene between states with strong parochial 
interests. 172 As law is an expression of its culture, the 
political divergence is ultimately reflected in the legal 
sys tern. 173 · 
Aldisert recommends that his observation about the 
United States' increasing utilization of codes be 
considered in light of the fact that a conception of what 
a code is and the functions it should perform in the 
legal process are two different things in the United 
States and in France. 174 
Craig Lawson also states that an understanding of 
his argument for considering the legal traditions similar 
should take into account the lasting differences. He 
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points out that the case analysis method in common law 
still receives much emphasis and that the civil law 
relies heavily on statutory interpretation . 175 
Additionally, the professional cultures of these two 
systems, particularly the role of the judges, remain 
distinct.m In fact he contends that the role of the 
judiciary is the most distinguishing feature of these two 
legal traditions and that the stark difference I 
discussed above still remain. 177 He also notes that legal 
reasoning and legal education in the two traditions 
remain significantly different . 178 
Zweigert and Kotz also warn students of comparative 
law not to overemphasize the apparent convergence between 
the dominant Western legal families. They argue that in 
civil law societies 11 the processes of law, especially 
court decisions still cling to traditional styles and 
forms. 11179 Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe agree with Lawson, 
Zweigert, and Kotz that significant differences between 
the two traditions remain more in the area of "mental 
processes, styles of argumentation, and in the 
organization and methodology of law than in positive 
legal norms . 11180 
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Lastly, Zweigert and Kotz contend that the question 
of whether or not the two traditions are converging on 
whether statute or judicial decision is the primary 
source of law isn't a very interesting one. 181 The more 
important question is whether in arriving at a decision 
in a case, judges in common law societies and civil law 
societies use different methods of finding and applying 
law. 182 Zweigert and Kotz seem to think that they do: 
Given that the development of political ideas 
and institutions in Western Europe was quite 
different from that in England and that in 
consequence the standing of the judge, the 
role of the advocate, the methods of legal 
education, and the forms of procedure all 
differed widely, it will come as no surprise 
that the techniques of discovering and apply-
ing the law, indeed the typical methods of 
legal thought as a whole, have developed very 
differently. 183 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Very little has been written on how the common and 
civil law traditions view·international law. Perhaps 
there is a reason for this. If it is the case that both 
the common law and civil law traditions are structured 
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according to basic principles of Western legal thought 
like freedom, individualism, rights and obligations, then 
we can expect that a judge on the World Court educated 
under the civil law tradition and another judge on the 
World Court educated under the common law would possess a 
similar understanding of these ideals and their relation 
to the social order. This is not to say that the two 
judges would agree on the precise meaning of these terms 
when applied to a set of facts or that they would share 
similar attitudes toward these legal ideals. Rather it 
is to say, like the scholars above, that these judges 
would assume a similar social order, a similar role for 
law, and a similar set of legal norms. In short, they 
would approach an international legal dispute from the 
perspective of the Western legal tradition which 
emphasizes individualism, freedom from state intrusion, 
and the possession of rights and correlative duties. 
These expectations are further justified by the 
fact that international law is a creation of Western 
legal minds. International law is founded upon the same 
basic principles as common law and, even more so, civil 
law, and in this century the international legal 
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structure has been developed by civil and common law 
legal scholars. One can observe the fundamental ideals 
of individualism and freedom that are central to those 
traditions given expression in international law through 
concepts like state sovereignty. Hence, if we accept the 
analysis of comparatists, international law most likely 
shares with the common and civil law traditions the 
enduring, fundamental similarities of all Western legal 
families and is most likely viewed by both common and 
civil law judges alike through the lens of Western legal 
thought. 
The divergence between the corrunon and civil law 
traditions on the matter of legal education, legal 
reasoning, the role of the judge, and the sources of law 
would, on the other hand, appear to have consequences for 
international law. The comparatists agree that the 
Western legal framework is shared by common law and civil 
law students, however, they also agree that differences 
endure. Alice Erh-Soon Taj elucidates the differences 
between common and civil law that she finds significant 
to the internationalization of law . 184 She avers that 
common law "recognizes the need to balance and weigh many 
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factors in doing justice according to law: the law and 
principles of law, past discussions and decisions, moral 
sentiments and standards of behavior to be found in the 
relevant community, expectations and aversions that may 
reasonably be expected to govern the behavior of people 
at particular times and in particular circumstances, 
considerations of welfare and ability, of public policy 
and interest and more recently of social justice. 11185 
Civil law instead relies on open-ended concepts like 
"fair, reasonable, proper, sound, common-sensical and 
just. 11186 Erh-Soon' s analysis can be understood as 
implying that judicial decision at the level of 
international law would be very different depending on 
the legal tradition, common law or civil law, with which 
a dispute is approached. 
It seems logical to suppose that the divergences 
identified by Erh-Soon and all the other comparatists 
would continue to be played out at the World Court, where 
justices of these differing traditions adjudicate 
disputes. Although international law does have a 
procedure and substance all its own, judges come to the 
Court with an education in the law and a history of 
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approaching the law in a particular fashion. One can 
expect that these habits do not fade away once an 
individual has become an international judge. Indeed the 
absence of an international legal tradition that educates 
and trains its students like the common and civil law 
legal traditions necessitates recourse to those 
established traditions or whatever other approaches one 
might employ for reasoning through the legal dilemma. 187 
Moreover, the purpose of this project is to 
determine the effect of legal tradition on a judge's 
discovery and application of the law. Thus, the 
supposition made here is that legal tradition, 
particularly the legal education and the role of the 
judge within that tradition, matters to judicial decision 
in domestic law and therefore might matter to judicial 
decision in international law since the justices take to 
the World Court their own education and training. 
The analysis of the decisions at the ICJ may not end 
the debate over whether the common law and civil law 
traditions are converging. However, it will focus on the 
methods used by the judges for applying and finding the 
law and through this process hopefully shed some light on 
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the debate. 
THE SOCIALIST LEGAL TRADITION 
History 
The eighty year old socialist law tradition is young 
compared to its counterparts in other areas of the 
world. 188 Although the Marxist philosophy upon which it is 
based originated a century earlier, it wasn't until the 
1917 October Revolution in the former Soviet Union that 
a socialist legal tradition began to form. 189 Since that 
date, socialist law has been distributed to many other 
countries outside the former Soviet Union including 
China, Poland, Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia, Albania, East 
Germany and Czechoslovakia. 190 
As stated in the first Chapter, socialist law is 
part of a larger Western legal tradition. Socialist law 
"exists within the family of civil law systems" but is 
infused with Marxist-Leninist ideology . 191 This may seem 
surprising given that classical Marxists have 
traditionally had no use for the law and have viewed it 
as an instrument of exploitation. 192 "Socialist legality" 
didn't come into force, however, until after a struggle, 
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lasting from about 1917 through 1921, between, on the one 
hand, Soviet jurist E.B. Pashukanis and other classical 
Marxists who thought that law would wither away under 
Socialism, and on the other hand, those in the Communist 
Party, led by Andrei Vyshinsky, who wanted to use the 
rule of law to facilitate the Marxist path to Communism. 
With Stalin's official support, victory came to 
Vyshinsky and the others who wanted to build a socialist 
theory of law. Stalin too believed that the rule of law 
could facilitate the betterment of humankind and thus the 
Soviets' transition to Communist society. 193 Hence, he 
followed the lead of other European leaders who had 
established Western codes of law with the purpose of 
centralizing power.~4 Because of his acceptance of 
Western legal thought and the promulgation of a 
constitution of 1936 in addition to a set of civil and 
criminal codes, scholars have referred to Stalin as the 
11 true father of modern Soviet law. 11195 But this title may 
be somewhat misleading. Since he eventually used it as a 
tool for legitimizing and facilitating his infamous 
"reign of terror", Stalin's commitment to a Western legal 
tradition and the rule of law appears disingenuous. 
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The Soviet Union underwent momentous legal reform 
under its next leader, Nikita Kruschev. By the time of 
his death in 1964, the Soviet Union had codified a 
substantial amount of legislation, civil and criminal, 
and had replaced the facade of law created by Stalin with 
a rule of law created, implemented, and enforced by the 
Communist Party. 196 The Soviet Union, then, from the late 
1950's to the mid 1960's, saw the development of a 
"Socialist legality" but with a methodology and 
infrastructure based on the civil law tradition. 197 
As in the civil law tradition, legislation was and 
continues to be the primary source of law. Judges under 
the socialist tradition enjoy even less independence than 
those in the civil law tradition and their teachings and 
writings are not considered law-making. 198 The following 
list of secondary sources of law in the Socialist legal 
tradition indicates that civil law and socialist law are 
significantly different; they are uniquely socialist: 
acts of social organizations, acts of state abitrazh 
(networks of tribunals having exclusive jurisdiction over 
economic disputes between the state and other 
enterprises), acts of military commands, court judgments, 
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and Marxist-Leninist doctrine. 
The leadership of Leonid Breshnev contributed to the 
development of a Socialist legality rooted in civil law. 
Under his rule, the Constitution of 1977 was promulgated, 
many of the existing codes were modified, and new 
legislation was enacted. 199 
Further developments occurred under Mikhail 
Gorbachev. The structural transformations he initiated 
in the Soviet Union involved, among other things, 
empowering the Socialist legal system to assist in the 
implementation of the policies introduced by Perestroika. 
One scholar, writing in 1986, observed that "Today's 
Socialist legality, incessantly proclaimed as the means 
of modeling society and educating its citizenry, 
facilitates improvements in the legal system, legal 
profession, and legal education ... the present Soviet 
regime relies on law to legitimize and stabilize a very 
unrevolutionary, even conservative regime. 
11200 
Although the legal system appears to have been 
gradually given more legitimacy and power since 1917, 
traditionally the Communist party leaders have steered 
the course for both the state and socialist legality. In 
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fact, the legal system in Socialist society must be 
understood as inseparable from the State. The Socialist 
conception of law demands that the legal system further 
the interests of the State. 
CONCEPTION OF THE LAW 
Again, Socialist law is founded upon the ideology 
of Marxism-Leninism. It begins with the assumption that 
legal relationships and forms of state have their roots 
in the material conditions of life. A rather lengthy 
quotation from Marx provides a succinct explanation of 
the essence of he and Engels' philosophy: 
In the social production of their lives people 
enter into definite and necessary· relationships 
which are independent of their will - production 
relationships, which correspond to the definite 
degree to which their material productive 
powers have developed. The totality of these 
production relationships constitutes the 
economic structure of society, the real basis 
upon which is built the juridical and political 
superstructure and to which definite forms of 
social consciousness correspond. The means of 
production of material life condition the 
social, political, and spiritual processes of 
life in general." 200 
The writings of Andrei Vyshinsky provide further 
insight into the Marxist-Leninist conception of law, or 
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perhaps more appropriately phrased 11 Socialist legality 11 • 
He explains that law is one of the superstructures 
forming the society's economic structure and that law 
11 depends on and is generated by production 
relationships. 11202 In a capitalist society law expresses 
the will of those who dominate - the capitalists. It is 
one of the tools the bourgeoisie class employs in its 
effort to oppress and exploit the productive masses. 
"Law is merely the will of the dominant class, elevated 
into a statute. 11203 
Socialist law, however, serves an entirely different 
purpose. It "protects the interests of the toiling 
masses, who have been emancipated from exploitation and 
the weight of capitalism. 11204 Socialist law, then, cannot 
be understood apart from the Socialist state. According 
to Vyshinsky, 11 law draws its force and obtains its 
content from the state 11205 , thus the ends of Socialist law 
are the ends of the Socialist state as defined by the 
Communist Party: 
* the elimination of exploitation and social inequality 
* the distribution of resources in proportion to labor 
* the guarantee to each individual full exercise of 
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creative forces. 2~ 
Vyshinsky acknowledges Socialist legality's civil law 
roots. He points out that soviet law is made up of the 
Corpus Juris Romani -"the gospel of Capitalist society"-
but insists that it has been infused with "the 
revolutionary legal consciousness of the masses. 11207 
According to Socialists, the Socialist legal system 
is designed to fulfill its mission of total 
reorganization of society. 208 It champions state ownership 
of land and of the dominant means of production and only 
grudgingly tolerates even the most minor instances of 
private ownership. 209 It upholds national economic 
planning and absolute fidelity to Soviet leadership. 210 
Finally, it seeks to mobilize the citizens for a united 
movement towards the ideal society. 211 
This last goal illuminates the spiritual dimension 
of Socialist legality and of Marx's philosophy in 
general. Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe refer to this 
aspect as 11 the theology of Socialist law. 11212 Marxism is a 
spiritual ideology, 11 a philosophy whose basic task is the 
fundamental remaking of the conscience of the people. 11213 
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Stated in very simplistic terms, Socialist legality 
is an all-encompassing ideology that seeks to replace the 
capitalist economic structure with, first, Socialism, and 
ultimately, Communism; law in a Socialist state has a 
facilitative function. But, as Zweigert and Kotz have 
observed, Socialist law also intends to be educational. 
Through consciousness-raising of the masses, the 
production relationships that exist under capitalism will 
be overthrown and supplanted with collective ownership of 
resources. Law operates to further the Socialist cause 
and it is intended to teach the transgressor how to live 
according to the principles of Socialism. The single 
guiding principle of Socialist law is Socialism and law's 
function is understandable only in light of Socialist 
ideology. 
INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE FORMAL LEGAL SYSTEM: A 
LOOK AT LEGAL EDUCATION & TRAINING AND THE ROLE OF JUDGES 
Legal Education: 
Immediately following the October Revolution, the 
Soviet system of legal education underwent massive 
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changes. The first step made by the Communist Party was 
to, in 1918, open up university law faculties to all who 
applied. 214 In 1919, the decision was made by Soviet 
authorities to send legal personnel to the European 
continent for education and training. 215 As this was the 
era of "legal nihilism", the traditional institutions for 
legal education, known as university law faculties, were 
replaced with faculties of social science and an academic 
education was stressed over a legal one. 216 Subsequently, 
law school enrollment dropped dramatically in the 1920's. 
When Vyshinsky's "Socialist legality" was officially 
approved by Stalin, legal study was reinstated and the 
university law faculties reopened. 217 Since that time, 
though, enrollment at law schools has been kept at a 
minimum. Although socialist legality had been embraced 
by the Communist Party and is, at the present, 
increasingly becoming a significant dimension of 
Socialist rule, the Communist Party has consistently 
kept the number of lawyers in society at a minimum. 218 
Those individuals who have been given the 
opportunity to earn a law degree in the Soviet Union 
completed either a four year or five year program at a 
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university law faculty . 219 The courses the students are 
required to take are similar to, at least prima facie, 
those offered in the other traditions we have examined: 
legal and governmental theory, legal and governmental 
history, governmental law and Soviet structure, 
Administrative and Financial Law, International Law, 
Civil Law, Criminal Law and Criminology, The Civil Trial, 
The Criminal Trial, Penology, and Labor Law. 220 
Considering its origin in civil law, it is not 
surprising that a Socialist legal education is in many 
ways similar to a European one. A Socialist legal 
education is free, i.e. the state provides it at no cost 
to the student. 221 As in civil law states, a legal 
education in the Soviet Union is non-professional and 
under exclusive control of the universities. 222 Thus it 
emphasizes the theoretical over the practical, the 
abstract over the concrete. 223 
Substantive knowledge of codes of law and Socialist 
ideology is the primary focus of legal study in Socialist 
countries and very little emphasis, if any, is placed on 
the development of skills of critical analysis. 224 
Students are schooled in the philosophy underlying the 
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law and are instructed in what the law is in particular 
areas and how to correctly apply it. 
One's success in a Socialist law school is 
determined by one's proficiency for delivering oral 
presentations; the ability to write well is given little 
weight in the grading process. 225 The planned shortage of 
lawyers in the former U.S.S.R. allows the state to 
guarantee every law school graduate a job as a jurist. 226 
Role of Judges: 
Unlike their peers in the common law, judges in the 
socialist legal tradition are not an elite group of 
citizens. 227 They receive low salaries and for years the 
Soviet Union did not require judges to have a legal 
education, hence their professional status has not been 
high. 2u Traditionally, judges in socialist legal syst~ms 
have been accountable to the Party and have been required 
to uphold and advance its objectives. 229 Consequently, 
judges in the socialist tradition have lacked the 
independence, status, and prestige that judges in common 
law sys terns enjoy . 230 
It has been observed that "the judiciary is truly 
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the least dangerous branch of the Socialist government. 11231 
With the exception of Poland, most of the Socialist 
governments have modeled their judiciary after the Soviet 
Union's. 232 In Communist China, Hungary, Mongolia, and 
Cuba the primary role of judges is to apply predetermined 
law to a given case. 233 Decisions are typically unanimous 
and the name of the author is almost always unknown. 234 In 
the event that a judge dissents from the decision of a 
court and writes an opinion, it is common practice in 
Socialist countries for the dissenting opinion to go 
unpublished. 235 
Although the courts are directly accountable to the 
Party, it is the case that in some areas of law 
legislators have given judges freedom, within established 
parameters, to apply creativity. 236 This appears to be 
more and more the case as legislatures have vested the 
Courts with the power "to facilitate development" of the 
Socialist person and 11 dispense justice" as it is 
understood in Socialist terms. 237 Still, the overriding 
position in Socialist states is that legislation 
established by representative bodies should not be 
delimited by 11 judge-made law". 238 And although courts in 
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Socialist states have fostered the development of 
Socialist law, historically the true source of law has 
been the Party. 239 
Vyshinsky states clearly the responsibility of the 
Socialist jurist committed to the philosophy of Marxism-
Leninism: 
[He] must expand his thinking beyond legal 
relationships and legal norms. He must reject 
this method in favor of dialectic materialism .. 
he must ponder relations of state/society, 
economic structure, production relationships .. 
the jurist cannot separate the science of public 
law from the science of economic development. 240 
THE SOCIALIST PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Socialists' view of international law is 
inseparable from their understanding of Western politics 
in general. International law is a tool employed by the 
bourgeoisie to f~cilitate their domination over the 
toiling masses. E.B. Pashukanis summed up succinctly the 
Socialist position on international law: "modern 
international law is the legal form of the struggle of 
the capitalist states among themselves for domination 
over the rest of the world. 11 ~1 
James Hildebrand notes that the Soviets nonetheless 
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admit that all states, including their own, use 
international law as a weapon. The only difference 
between the Socialist states and the Western states is 
that the former use international law to strengthen the 
"democratic principles of law and peace in international 
relations," while the latter uses it as a "means of 
deceiving the peoples, of concealing imperialist designs 
of expansion and aggression. 11242 
Hildebrand offers an excellent analysis of the 
relationship between Socialist law and international law. 
He notes that the Socialist view of society creates a 
dilemma for Soviets in the realm of international law. 
He argues that Socialists, in an effort to be part of an 
international community, have had to decide whether to 
create an international legal system all their own or to 
collaborate with the Western powers regardless of their 
fundamentally irreconcilable socio-political outlooks. 243 
According to Hildebrand, the history of Socialist legal 
thought with regard to international law has involved a 
series of attempts to reconcile traditional international 
law with Marxist-Leninist doctrine. 244 
Hildebrand and others suggest that it was the 
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writings of one Soviet legal theorist in particular, 
Grigori I. Tunkin, which brought the Socialists closer to 
a reconciliation of international law and Marxism. 245 In 
1956, Tunkin conceded that international law would have 
to represent, to at least a certain extent, a compromise 
between socialist and capitalist states desirous of a 
body of rules applicable to all states. If international 
law were to embody only Socialist principles or only 
capitalist principles then the states with differing 
ideologies would be unable to agree on universal rules 
for state behavior. Despite these concessions, Tunkin 
nonetheless remained firm on the notion of Soviet 
supremacy in international law and credited his home 
state with guiding the course of international law. 246 
At roughly the same point in time that Tunkin was 
contributing his ideas on Socialist legal theory, the 
great Socialist states, China and the U.S.S.R., agreed to 
adhere to five principles in their international legal 
relations with capitalist states: 
1. the principle of the maintenance of mutual respect 
for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other 
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states; 
2. the mutual obligation not to attack other states; 
3. the mutual obligation of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of other states; 
4. mutual equality and the granting of equal advantages; 
5. peaceful coexistence. 247 
In more recent years, cooperation has replaced 
coexistence as the most important element in the 
international legal relationship between the Soviets and 
the Western states. 248 The 11 new thinking 11 that was 
introduced into Soviet Society in the mid to late 1980's 
in the form of Perestroika and Glasnost and which fueled 
the break-up of the U.S.S.R. has helped to engender a 
less antagonistic relationship, at least·legally 
speaking, between the Soviets and the developed Western 
states. Still, one would expect differences to remain. 
# 
Surely, as long as the Socialist and capitalist states 
have fundamental political disagreements, these will be 
reflected in international law. However, I would argue 
that even if these political disagreements vanished 
tomorrow, the legacy of Socialist legal education and 
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training would remain at the World Court for some time. 
Although Hildebrand noticed as early as 1969 a 
warming of the relationship between the Soviet Union and 
the Western states, those Soviets in positions of power 
in international law today were educated and trained 
under a strongly Socialist state. 249 Even though dramatic 
changes have occurred in the U.S.S.R. in the past decade 
or so, those transformations do not erase the Socialist 
past and in fact, those transformations remain in a state 
of instability. So, the fact that the Soviets and the 
Western states have warmed up to one another in the 
international legal arena does not eradicate the 
possibility that a Socialist legal education determines 
the way in which a judge on the Court discovers and 
applies international law. Indeed, it might be the case 
that it is precisely this Socialist legal education and 
training that divides Socialist judges from their Western 
counterparts in those cases that they disagree. Since it 
will take at the very least another twenty years until 
the newest generation in the U.S.S.R. could become 
influential in international law, it ought to be expected 
that if Socialist legality were to fade out of the 
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international legal s~ene, it would not be for many years 
to come. 
From the discussion of the Socialist legal system 
above, one would expect to find substantive and 
procedural divergences between Socialist judges at the 
ICJ and their counterparts educated under other legal 
traditions. If Socialist thought structures Socialist 
legality and is as all-encompassing as legal scholars 
like Vyshinsky and Tunkin argued it was, then one would 
expect the decisions of Socialist judges at the ICJ to 
reflect elements of Socialist, or Marxist-Leninist 
thought. This is made even more true by the fact that 
judges educated under a Socialist legal tradition were 
taught to be a servant of the Socialist state and to 
unquestioningly enforce its laws. Of course the judges 
at the World Court are not instructed to enforce or apply 
Socialist law or to follow the dictates of a Communist 
Party. However, one would likely infer from the 
teachings of the legal scholars noted above that the 
Socialist judge is supposed to represent Socialist 
principles at an international forum. The judge's 
commitment to Socialist ideals may have relaxed a bit 
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with the transition from coexistence to cooperation, but 
one would not want to suppose that cooperation on the 
part of the Soviets means acceptance of capitalist 
principles and practices. 
One's expectations of finding elements of Marxist-
Leninist thought may contradict, however, the expectation 
that Socialist judges will not deliver lengthy written 
opinions or that they will not deliver separate opinions 
at all. The emphasis in Socialist legal education on 
oral over written presentation makes an analysis of a 
written decision by a Socialist judge potentially 
problematic. An examination of a judgment for Marxist-
Leninist thought is not made easy by a short written 
judgment or no opinion at all. 
On the other hand, one should not be surprised to 
find at the World Court a history of Socialist judges 
dissenting without a written opinion since the opinion of 
the judges in Socialist legal systems is not highly 
valued. Still, on the other hand, one might not be 
surprised by a Socialist judge who never dissents since 
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Since these expectations are clearly contradictory, 
I would like to emphasize that the focus of this study is 
international law, not domestic law. With this and the 
Socialist position on international law in mind, I would 
think it more likely that Socialist judges at the World 
Court would dissent from the judgment submitted by the 
majority of justices than acquiesce simply because that 
is what they were educated to do. The Socialist judge 
plays a role at the World Court that is entirely 
different than the role she or he would play in the 
judiciary of her or his native state; the requirements of 
the role of representing the Party are very different at 
home than in international legal relations. A judge 
operating within the Socialist state upholds the law 
created by the Party by behaving as a diligent servant of 
the Party. A Socialist judge at the World Court is not 
dealing with law created by the Party and thus, to be a 
diligent servant of the Party may have to dissent from 
the majority who might represent Western powers. 
One should not expect, however, that a dissenting 
Socialist judge at the World Court will deliver an 
opinion amounting to a lengthy treatise on Marxism-
75 
----------- -- -- - - -------- -- - -- - -- -- ----
Leninism. The legal tradition under which these 
individuals have been bred taught them habits and methods 
that should be reflected in their decision-making at the 
World Court. Further, with the cooperation that has been 
witnessed in the international legal relations between 
the Soviet Union and the West one would expect to see a 
degree of ideological tolerance evolving between these 
judges. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The International Court of Justice 
The ICJ has rendered decisions in over 76 
international disputes since its inception in 1946. 2~ 
This project looks at three of these cases and analyzes 
them with a view to discovering whether the legal 
tradition under which a justice is educated and trained 
for a career in the legal profession determines how she 
or he finds and applies the law when adjudging an 
international dispute at the World Court. The 
limitations of space and time preclude a full-scale 
investigation into each and every decision made by the 
Court throughout its entire history. Instead, a 
determination may be made through an examination of a 
smaller set of cases chosen on the basis of clearly 
defined criteria. 251 
The three disputes selected for analysis were chosen 
because they each satisfied certain criteria. First, 
each case was decided during a period of the ICJ's 
activity that is distinguishable from the next. Scott, 
Bothwell, and Pennell examined the history of the Court's 
activity and found, based on the political and legal 
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developments since its inception, that the ICJ's history 
could be logically divided into three eras: ICJ I (1946 
through 1962), ICJ II (1963 through 1985), and ICJ III 
( 1986 to present) . 252 
Scott et al. argue that ICJ I can be understood as a 
period of legal idealism. 253 With the recent memory of two 
world wars firmly in their minds, state leaders turned to 
international law for a peaceful settlement of their 
disputes. 254 ICJ I represents one of the busiest 
schedules in the Court's history; from 1946 to 1962 
thirty one contentious cases and 12 advisory opinions 
were submitted to the Court. 255 
The period known as ICJ II marked a significant 
decline in the number of cases submitted to the Court. 256 
From 1963 to 1985, the Court received only 12 submissions 
of contentious cases and 6 submissions for advisory 
opinion. 257 Scott et al. further point out that several 
of the judgments delivered by the Court during these 
years were outrightly defied. 258 They explain this period 
of inactivity at the Court as the result of the 
intensification of cold war hostilities, including the 
October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 259 
78 
--- -------- ----
Like ICJ I, ICJ III represents a period of upost-war 
legal euphoria. "260 As the Cold War has come to an end, 
the ICJ is experiencing another round of high activity. 
It appears that once again states are perceiving their 
disputes as ones that would be best solved through the 
application of legal rules and principles. 
The cases I chose satisfied a second criterion: 
division. Divisive judgments appear to provide excellent 
case studies for reaching conclusions about judicial 
decision-making by individual justices at the World 
Court. Because they typically generate individual 
opinions, both dissents and concurring opinions, they 
also tend to provide further insight into the legal 
reasoning of individual justices. On the other hand, 
cases with a majority judgment representing nearly every 
justice on the Court tell us comparatively less about the 
way each judge found and applied the law in a given case. 
To be sure, a judgment supported by the entire court may 
be indicative of a uniform method of finding and applying 
the law in a par~icular case. Nonetheless, the history 
of the Court demonstrates that it has been split on more 
occasions than it has been in full agreement, and thus 
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warrants an examination into potentially divergent 
approaches to judicial decision at the World Court. 
More importantly, however, divisive judgments 
represent those cases that most likely diverge on lines 
of legal tradition. Because the judges come to the Court 
with very different backgrounds and legal experience, a 
one-sided judgment most likely indicates that legal 
tradition did not determine how the justices found and 
applied the law. The cases I have chosen are widely 
split with, in some cases, the majority of the Court 
filing separate opinions, declarations or dissents in 
opposition to the Court's judgment or the way in which it 
arrived at the judgment. 
I have also chosen to omit from the following 
examination the decisions and votes of the ad hoc judges 
in these cases. Although the votes of these individuals 
carry equal weight in the cases and are of ten accompanied 
by individual opinions, research indicates that ad hoc 
judges almost always vote in favor of the state that 
appointed them. 261 In one study, Il Ro Suh found that 
from 1922-1967 ad hoc judges voted with the government 
that appointed them in 91% of the decisions. 262 Thomas 
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Hensley found, in another study, that ad hoc judges 
deviated from the other justices on the Court 44% of the 
time, showing a marked voting preference for the 
countries selecting them. This evidence should not be 
surprising, as ad hoc judges are appointed to the Court 
for one case by a state who is a party to that case. 
ICJ I: The Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian 
Territory, Judgment (12 April 1960) 263 
Facts and Arguments: 
On December 22, 1955 the state of Portugal filed an 
application with the ICJ requesting that the Court uphold 
a Portuguese right of passage through Indian territory. 264 
Portugal maintained that its sovereignty over three 
enclaves in the Indian Peninsula, Goa, Daman and Diu, was 
violated in July, 1954 when Indian authorities prevented 
Portugal from passing through Indian territory to the 
enclaves. 265 
In its application Portugal explained that prior to 
July, 1954 the Indian and British practice was to allow 
J 
the Portuguese. to pass through Indian territory with the 
purpose of exercising Portuguese rights of sovereignty 
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over the enclaves. The Application alleged that since 
1950 the situation had changed and that the Government of 
India had denied a right of passage in July of 1954 
pursuant with the 11 an open campaign 11 it was waging for 
the annexation of Portuguese territories, specifically 
the enclaves located within Indian territory. 266 It 
further alleged that the Indian government had initiated 
and supported a violent uprising on the enclaves that 
begun prior to July of 1954 and that by denying Portugal 
passage the Indian government was effectively preventing 
the Portuguese government from putting a stop to the 
violence. 267 
Portugal insisted that India's refusal to allow 
Portugal the right of passage in July of 1954 was in 
violation of international law and part of a larger 
effort on the part of India to expropriate the enclaves 
that belonged to the state of Portugal. Counsel for 
Portugal cited the following sources of law as supportive 
of the state's position: 1) The Treaty of Poona 
concluded between Portugal and the Marathas in 1779 
transferring sovereignty of the enclaves to Portugal; 2) 
local custom and general custom; and 3) concordance of 
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municipal legal systems with respect to access to 
enclaved land. 268 Portugal further argued that state 
practice and opinio juris supported its alleged right of 
transit. 269 
India invoked the reservations it had attached to 
its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction.of the Court. 
In its fifth preliminary objection, the government of 
India denied that the ICJ possessed jurisdiction over the 
case, insisting that the dispute involved Indian 
territory and thus fell under India's jurisdiction. 270 In 
a sixth preliminary objection, it further opposed the 
Court's jurisdiction, but on the grounds that the 
situation began prior to February 5, 1930, the date set 
by India in its acceptance of the Optional Clause 
stipulating that no dispute arising earlier than it could 
be adjudicated by the Court. 271 
On the merits, India maintained that a right of 
passage could not be recognized generally; states reserve 
the right to limit the right of passage if the situation 
calls for it. A right of passage is both indeterminate 
and indeterminable - it finds no basis in principles of 
international law or in custom, local or general. 272 
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Counsel for India further argued that the treaty Portugal 
relied on for its case was not a treaty at all but rather 
a set of negotiations that never resulted in an 
agreement. 273 India held that there was never any official 
transfer of sovereignty of the enclaves in question to 
the state of Portugal; if the Portuguese usurped 
sovereignty of the enclaves, the Indians reasoned, the 
right of passage surely did not come with this title of 
sovereignty. 274 India also pointed to governmental acts of 
both Great Britain and India between 1818 and 1954 as 
proof of a denial on their part of a Portuguese right of 
passage. 275 
Finally, in defense of its denial of passage to 
Portugal on July 1954, India described the violent 
uprising in the enclaves as a liberation movement by 
Asians who desired to join the Union of Independent 
India.n6 India denied the accusation that it was 
assisting the overthrow of Portuguese power in the 
enclaves and argued that at the time of the request for 
and subsequent denial of passage to Portugal, any 
Portuguese presence in the enclaves would have escalated 
the violent conflict.m 
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Judgment: 
The issue at the heart of the Right of Passage case 
is one that concerns all states: territorial 
sovereignty. The Court in the Right of Passage Case was 
charged with determining the limits and/or extent of 
state sovereignty with regard to a right of passage. A 
right of passage threatens a state which must cede it to 
other states because it represents a limitation to the 
authority that that state may assert over territory its 
government rightfully claims as its own. 
The overriding issue of sovereignty is evidenced in 
the questions upon which the Court voted. The following 
is a breakdown of those votes: 
I 
1) 13 to 2 - The Court rejected India's fifth 
preliminary objection wherein the Indian government 
argued that the question of the grant or refusal of the 
passage claimed over Indian territory by Portugal fell 
exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of India and 
outside the jurisdiction of the Court; 
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2) 11 to 4 - The Court rejected India 1 s sixth preliminary 
objection wherein the Indian government argued that the 
dispute arose before 5 February 1930; 
3) 11 to 4 - The Court found that Portugal did have in 
Indian territory between the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-
Aveli and the coastal 1954 a right of passage over 
intervening district of Daman and between those 
enclaves, to the extent necessary for the exercise of 
Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves and subject to 
the regulation and control of India, in respect of 
private persons, civil officials and goods in 
general; 
4) 8 to 7 - It found that Portugal did not have in 1954 
such a right of passage in respect of armed forces, armed 
police, and arms and ammunition; 
5) 9 to 6 - The Court found that India had not failed in 
1954 to fulfill its obligation in regard to that right of 
passage; 278 
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Majority = M 
Dissent = D 
Separate Opinion = so 
JUDGES-TRADITION 
Klaestad - civil 
Zaf. Khan - common 
Basdevant - civil 
Hackworth - common 
Winiarski - civ/soc 
Badawi - civil 
Spender - common 
Armond-Ugon - civil 
Kojevnikov - social 
Quintana - civil 
Cordova - civil 
Koo - common 
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By a vote of 13 to 2 the Court rejected India's fifth 
preliminary objection. The Court observed that Portugal 
had invoked international law to support its position and 
it agreed with the Portuguese that the dispute was on an 
international plane. 279 It also struck down India's sixth 
preliminary objection which precluded a state from 
bringing to the Court a dispute which originated prior to 
5 February 1930. The Court found the law relevant to 
this objection in the PCIJ's decision in the case of the 
Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria. 280 In that case 
the Court ruled that the prior situation or facts of a 
dispute which are to be considered in adjudicating that 
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dispute are only those which are the source of the 
dispute not the source of the right in question in the 
dispute . 281 
On the merits, the Court upheld India's argument 
that the Treaty of Poona did not grant sovereignty of the 
enclaves to Portugal and that rather what was established 
was a revenue tenure. 282 By granting permission of transit 
to the Portuguese to collect revenue in the villages the 
Indian and British governments had not established a 
Portuguese right of passage. 
On the matter of customary international law, 
however, the Court did accept Portugal's argument that 
because the British and Indian governments never objected 
to the Portuguese representing themselves as sovereign of 
the enclaves, those governments tacitly recognized 
Portugal as sovereign over the village. According to the 
Court, past practice demonstrated that the passage by the 
Portuguese of private persons, civil officials, and goods 
into the enclaves went unhindered, with the exception of 
blockages during World War II. 283 The Court observed that 
for one and one quarter century, the constant and uniform 
practice of allowing free passage between Daman and the 
88 
--------------------------------- - --~--
enclaves for transporting private persons, civil 
officials and goods endured and thus developed into a law 
between the Parties with the establishment of a right for 
Portugal and a correlative obligation for India. 284 
The situation was different, however, for passage of 
armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition. The 
Court found no evidence supporting Portugal's claim that 
all transit was exercised or permitted and in fact it 
cited evidence that demonstrated that previous 
authorization was required to send armed forces, etc. 
through British and then Indian territory. 285 In short, 
the Court found a right of transit and a correlative 
obligation with regard to the passage of civil and 
private persons and goods but neither a right nor an 
obligation pertaining to the passage of armed forces, 
armed police, arms, and ammunition. 
Composition of the Court: 286 
Helge Klaestad (Norway): Judge Klaestad earned his Doctor 
Juris at the University in Oslo, a civil law institution. 
Shortly thereafter he embarked on a career in 
international arbitration. He presided over the Anglo-
I 
German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in London and in the 
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following year he became the Sole Arbitrator of a number 
of bilateral treaties. After many more similar 
appointments, Judge Klaestad was finally appointed to the 
Supreme Court of Norway in 1931 and fifteen years later 
he became a justice at the ICJ. Judge Klaestad served on 
the ICJ from 1946 to 1961. 
Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, (Pakistan): Judge'Zafrulla Khan 
was educated under the common law tradition as he 
received his Bachelor of Arts from Punjab University and 
a Bachelor of Laws from King's College in London. He has 
held many prestigious appointments including President of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, member of the 
Supreme Court of India and first Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the newly created Republic of Pakistan. Judge 
Zafrulla Khan served on the ICJ from 1954 to 1961 and 
again from 1964 to 1973. 
Jules Basdevant, (France): Judge Basdevant earned his 
Doctor of Law in Legal, Political and Economic Sciences 
in a civil law institution on the European continent. He 
was a professor of law at Rennes, Grenoble and Paris and 
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at the Naval Staff College, the Centre of Higher Naval 
Studies, and at the Academy of International Law at The 
Hague. Judge Basdevant was a member of the French 
delegation at many international conferences, an agent of 
the French government in many international arbitrations, 
and legal advisor to the French Foreign Ministry. He 
served on the ICJ from 1946 to 1964. 
Green H. Hackworth, (U.S.A.): Educated at Valparaiso, 
Georgetown University, George Washington University and 
the University of Kentucky, Judge Hackworth was a student 
of the common law tradition. For twenty years he worked 
in the State Department serving as an attorney, a 
solicitor, and as legal advisor to the Secretary of 
State. He sat on the Supreme Court of the District of 
Columbia and represented the United States at numerous 
international legal conferences. Judge Hackworth served 
on the ICJ from 1946 to 1961. 
Bohdan Stefan Winiarski, (Poland): Judge Winiarski was 
educated in the law at Warsaw, Cracow, Heidelberg and 
Paris, all civil law universities at the time of his 
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education. Early on in his tenure at the ICJ, however, 
the October revolution brought Socialist thought to the 
Soviet Union and to its Eastern European satellites, 
including Poland. His teaching position in Cracow was 
interrupted in 1917 when he was enlisted in the Russian 
Army. He eventually returned to teach law in Poland and 
serve as a diplomat for his country. Judge Winiarski 
served on the ICJ from 1946 to 1967. 
Abdal-Hamid Badawi, (Egypt): Judge Badawi received his 
Doctor of Law from the University of Grenoble, a civil 
law institution. In Egypt he was a Professor of law , a 
Director in the Ministry of Justice, and Legal Adviser to 
the government. He also served as Minister of Finance, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Senator. Like many of 
his counterparts on the ICJ, he was a delegate for his 
country at many international conferences. Judge Badawi 
served on the ICJ from 1946 to 1965. 
Sir Percy Spender, (Australia): Judge Spender received a 
common law legal education at Sydney University in 
Australia. His interests led him to a career in public 
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service in both domestic and international roles. He was 
a member of the House of Representatives, Treasurer, 
Minister for External Affairs, and Ambassador to the 
United States. He led many Australian delegations to 
international conferences and was Vice-President of the 
5th General Assembly of the U.N. Judge Spender served on 
the ICJ from 1958 to 1967. 
Enrique C. Armand-Ogon, (Uruguay): Although no clear 
information exists, it appears that Judge Armand-Ugon 
received his Doctor in Law and Social Sciences in 
Uruguay, a civil law state. There he worked as a 
Provincial Attorney, a Judge of the Court of First 
Instance, a Judge in the Court of App~al, a Judge in the 
High Court, and he finally served as President of the 
High Court. Like his counterparts on the World Court, he 
was represented his country at many international 
conferences. Judge Armand-Ugon served on the ICJ from 
1952 to 1961. 
Feodor Ivanovich Kojevnikov, (O.S.S.R.): Judge Kojevnikov 
studied socialist law at Moscow University in the 1920's. 
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He became a professor upon graduation and twice served as 
Dean of his Faculty. Kojevnikov held several 
appointments with the Soviet government including 
President of the Legal Section of the Society for 
Cultural Relations of the USSR with Foreign Countries and 
Member of the Committee of Experts in Legal Science at 
the Ministry of Culture of the USSR. Judge Kojevnikov 
served on the ICJ from 1953 to 1961. 
Lucio Manuel Moreno Quintana, (Argentina): Judge Moreno 
Quintana earned a Doctor of Law at Buenos Aires, a civil 
law institution, in 1920. For most of his life he worked 
as a university professor in Buenos Aires however his 
success took him to lectures all over the world. He held 
the directorship of the International Law Institute in 
Buenos Aires and in addition to teaching, held public 
offices. Judge Moreno Quintana served on the ICJ from 
1955 to 1964. 
Roberto Cordova, (Mexico): Judge Cordova also studied 
law under the civil law tradition, at the National 
University of Mexico. Throughout most of his career 
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prior to becoming a judge at the ICJ he served as a 
diplomat for Mexico. He was a delegate to numerous 
international conferences and was appointed Legal Advisor 
to the Mexican Foreign Service. Judge Cordova served on 
the ICJ from 1955 to 1964. 
V.K. Wellington Koo, (China): Judge Wellington Koo was 
educated in the common law in America at Columbia 
University. He became a government official upon his 
return to China and from 1915 to 1920 he served as 
Minister to Mexico, Cuba and the USA. He represented 
China at the League of Nations and from 1926-1927 was 
both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of China. 
Judge Wellington Koo served on the ICJ from 1957 to 1967. 
Jean Spiropoulos, (Greece): Judge Spiropoulos was 
educated in the civil law on the European continent and 
earned his Doctor of Law in Leipzig in 1922. In Greece 
he became a Professor of International Law at Salonika 
and Director of the Legal Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. He then turn~d to the international 
sphere where he held, among other positions, the 
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chairmanship of the International Law Commission. He was 
a delegate for Greece at several international 
conferences and served as judge ad hoc in the Ambatielos 
case. Judge Spiropoulos served on the ICJ from 1958-
1967. 
Analysis: 
From the distribution of votes presented in the 
table above, one is led to conclude that, at least in the 
case of the justices who comprised the majority and were 
educated under either a common law or civil law system, 
legal tradition was not a variable in the judicial 
decision-making process. An analysis of the decision 
confirms this observation. 
In its effort to find the law, the Court concerned 
itself primarily with the practice that had evolved 
between the two states. Indeed it explicitly found the 
law governing this dispute in one and one quarter 
century's worth of state practice between Portugal, on 
the one hand, and India and Great Britain on the other. 
The law applicable to this matter was a product of the 
interactions of these particular states: 
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The Court is here dealing with a concrete case 
having special features. Historically the c~se 
goes back to a period when, and relates to a 
region in which, the relations between neigh-
bouring States were not regulated by precisely 
formulated rules but were governed largely by 
practice. Where therefore the Court finds a 
practice clearly established between the two 
States which was accepted by the Parties as 
governing the relations between them, the Court 
must attribute decisive effect to that 
practice for the purpose of determining their 
specific rights and obligations. Such a 
particular practice must prevail over any 
general rules. 287 
Taking into consideration that state practice and 
opinio juris are fundamental sources of customary 
international law, the judgment may not be surprising. 288 
Nonetheless, the Court's emphasis on the history of the 
relations of the two states, i.e. the facts, and the 
understandings the governments had about these relations, 
is reflective of the common law style of reasoning. One 
sees in an examination of the decision that the Court 
spent little time dwelling on the principle of 
territorial sovereignty at issue in the case and in fact 
searched for the limits and/or extent of sovereignty 
through its examination of the facts and of the 
understandings each state displayed about Portugal's 
passage through Indian territory. 
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This common law style of reasoning is countered by 
the Court's application of the law which is more 
representative of a civil law approach to adjudication. 
The justices who comprised the majority limited their 
function to an application of the law found through a 
knowledge of the facts. They did not set out to create 
law or impose judge-made law on Portugal and India. 
Instead, they applied the law that they perceived to have 
been created by the two states in conflict over the 
course of history. 
Thus the Court's method of finding and applying the 
law was not representative of one legal tradition nor was 
the judgment a product of only or mostly civil law judges 
or only or mostly common law judges; the judgment 
embodied methods of judicia1 reasoning and decision that 
could be traced back to both the common and civil law 
traditions. 
Thus we may want to interpret the decision of the Court 
in The Right of Passage Case as more reflective of 
international law and the rules it establishes for the 
justices than of a particular type of legal tradition 
that dominated the Court at that time. If customary 
98 
------------·------------
international law, a primary source of international law, 
is the law governing this dispute, then an examination of 
the facts is the requisite method for discovering the 
law. If it is customary international law that is being 
determined, the Court would want to determine what the 
state practice relevant to the dispute was between the 
two states and whether or not the additional component of 
opinio juris had been developed. Further, if the Court 
perceived its function in the same way as states 
perceived it, then it would assist the states in 
determining what law they had created rather than 
creating law itself. 
The dissenting opinions do, however, raise the 
possibility that legal tradition may have been a variable 
in at least one decision. Like the majority, the 
dissenters are an eclectic group. Aside from the two ad 
hoc judges, they are composed of three civil law judges, 
one common law judge, one judge educated in the common 
law and Asian law, one Socialist judge, and one judge 
educated in the civil law and practiced in Socialist law. 
Justice Moreno Quintana, a civil law judge, began 
his process of legal reasoning with an explication of the 
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principle of state territorial sovereignty which he 
viewed as placing a burden on Portugal to prove why India 
had an obligation to honor a right a passage.• He 
averred that a right of passage is neither varying nor 
inexact; 11 ~he right either exists in law or it does 
not. 11290 He further refused to consider the claim of 
sovereignty based on practice as he saw that the Court 
had done in its judgment. Before turning to an analysis 
of the facts, Moreno Quintana explained how he would 
judge their significance in the dispute: 
In the international sphere the normal method of 
acquiring rights or of contracting obligations 
takes the form of an agreement, which in its 
widest sense is termed a treaty ... In any case, 
I consider that the validity of a general 
principle may take the place of international 
custom, and the existence of international 
custom the place of a treaty.mi 
It appears, from this brief analysis, that Moreno 
Quintana's entire judgment hinged on what he believed 
should have been done in principle as he concludes it 
with a statement about how the Court's support of the 
Portuguese claims to sovereignty over the islands equates 
to support of the survival of the colonial system. To 
uphold Portugal's claim to a right of passage with regard 
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to civilians and goods is to "fly in the face of the 
United Nations Charter. 11292 He warned the Court that it, 
as the judge of its own law and the judge of its own age, 
"cannot turn its back upon the world as it is. 
International law must adapt itself to political 
necessities. "293 
Moreno Quintana appears to be searching for an 
answer to the fundamental question underlying the civil 
law tradition: "What is just?" His single-minded 
concern with principle is representative of the reasoning 
taught to students of the civil law. However, if his 
method for discovering the law looks more reflective of 
the civil law tradition, then his admonition to the Court 
betrays a common law perception of the judge as a 
powerful individual with the authority and duty to create 
law as she or he sees fit. He implores the Court to take 
a stand against imperialism through its judicial 
capacity, in essence asking the Court to make a political 
statement rather than a legal one. He is, in this sense, 
the quintessential common law judge exercising the power 
to make grand statements about the morality of the law. 
These observations notwithstanding, the substance of 
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Moreno Quintana's concerns can lead one to a different 
conclusion about why he discovered and applied the law 
the way that he did. Recall that Moreno Quintana is a 
judge from Latin America, specifically Argentina. With 
this in mind, his decision may look more like a political 
statement than a legal one. It is no secret that many 
Latin American governments and those of other relatively 
less developed states have been and continue to be 
dissatisfied with what they perceive to be a domination 
of global resources by more developed and consequently, 
more powerful states. 294 These governments often criticize 
the institution of colonization of smaller, less 
developed regions by larger, more powerful states as 
exploitative relationships designed to keep the power 
imbalance in place. 295 Thus, Moreno Quintana's admonition 
could have been, and in light of the observations made 
about the influence of legal tradition on the majority 
and on Moreno Quintana, may have more likely been 
politically motivated. If Moreno Quintana's discovery 
and application of the law exemplifies elements of both 
the common law and civil law traditions, and perhaps too 
the Socialist law tradition with its disdain for Western 
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imperialism, then it seems that the probability that the 
legal tradition under which he was educated and worked 
most of his life, the civil law, is slim. This being the 
case, it would seem that the alternative explanation, 
based on political convictions, is the more powerful one. 
This finding furt~er strengthens the conclusion made 
about the judgment. 
Armand-Ugon and Badawi were the only other 
dissenters whose methods for discovering and applying the 
law may be attributable to a civil law education. Badawi 
expressed concern over the difficulty of reconciling 
recognition of sovereignty with the exercise of a 
discretion which, in principle, repudiates one essential 
consequence of that sovereignty. 296 Still, he indicated 
that the answer to this question could only be found 
through a thorough analysis of the facts. He did, 
however, mention that the confusion surrounding some of 
the facts may have obscured the "true legal aspect" of 
the relations between Portugal and Great Britain, and 
then India - an indication that truth is somewhere 
lurking behind the confusion of the facts. 297 
Armand-Ugon also demonstrated a slight interest in 
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finding the 11 right 11 answer; he expressed concern with the 
right of territorial sovereignty and the demands that it 
made upon the states and the Court. Before presenting 
his argument, Armand-Ugon advised his fellow judges: 
Our reasoning must proceed on the basis of the 
validity of the argument in favour of full 
sovereignty and of that in favour of a saran-
jam ... It would be inadmissible to grant sover-
eignty over certain territories or a saranjam 
of certain villages and then to set up 
obstacles to the fulfillment of the obligations 
agreed upon . 298 
Both Armand-Ugon and Badawi then reasoned, albeit to 
varying degrees, with a governing principle in mind. 
The rest of the justices who dissented from at least 
one question on the merits concentrated exclusively on 
the facts of the case and on what law could be found in 
the history of the dispute. Judge Spender, who disagreed 
with the Court's distinction between the passage of armed 
forces, etc. and civilian goods and persons and its 
conclusion that India had not acted contrary to its 
obligation, appears to have placed concerns of principle 
in his argument as a second premise. He began his 
argument with an analysis of the meaning of the Treaty of 
Poona and proceeded to examine the historical record on 
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Portuguese passage to the enclaves, citing dates and 
British and Indian responses to requests for passage. 299 
Only after the discussion of facts did Spender touch upon 
some of the principles governing the dispute. He stated 
that "a necessity to apply for a license before an act is 
done is not necessarily incompatible with a right to do 
that act. 11 ~0 He further asserted that "discretion in 
refusing and granting permission is not absolute - it is 
controllable and must be exercised in good faith. 11301 
This type of argument is also on display in 
Wellington Koo's separate opinion. Like Spender, he 
objected to that part of the Court's decision that takes 
armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition out 
of the scope of the right of passage. 302 And again, like 
Spender, Wellington Koo paid close attention to the facts 
of the case, including documents such as agreements, 
notes, and treaties. He cited dates and recorded the 
responses of Britain and India to Portuguese requests for 
transit to the enclaves. 
Again, only after he established the factual 
situation and found that there developed a practice of 
allowing all types of goods and persons to pass to the 
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enclaves did Wellington Koo make recourse to principles 
of international law or ideas about state behavior. 303 
Once he established that India behaved in ways indicating 
that it considered Portugal the sovereign over the 
enclaves, Wellington Koo commented that the fact that an 
enclaved land has been able to enjoy passage through the 
surrounding land of another state is 11 based upon.reason 
and the elementary principle of justice. 11304 
Another disagreement on the Court that cannot go 
unmentioned, one between Kojevnikov and Winiarski, hints 
to a split along lines of legal tradition. Judge 
Kojevnikov's brief and unexplained refusal to accept 
jurisdiction contrasts with Judge Winiarski's joint 
dissent with Badawi wherein, based on an analysis of the 
facts and arguments of the parties, they reject the 
Court's position on the sixth preliminary objection and 
find the origin of the dispute at an earlier date. 
This prima facie divergence, however, might not be a 
split at all as Winiarski's education was considerably 
more eclectic than that of the Soviet judge. Recall that 
Winiarski studied in Paris and Heidelberg in addition to 
Cracow and Warsaw and that Socialism had not been 
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introduced into Poland until after his education. So 
although Winiarski identified himself as a Socialist, his 
civil law education combined with what may be a civil law 
tendency to perceive of his judicial function as more 
participatory (when compared to the Soviet perception) 
may have made a strong imprint on his judicial role in 
this case. 
Kojevnikov, on the other hand, studied law in Moscow 
immediately after the introduction of Socialism. This 
was also the era of "legal nihilism" when law schools and 
the legal profession were downplaying the importance of 
law including the role of the judge. One might be able 
to explain Kojevnikov's brief declaration as indicative 
of his Socialist legal education which did not place high 
value on the practice of writing as it did on oral 
presentation. Kojevnikov's brief and terse declaration 
corresponds with the expectation that Socialist judges at 
the World Court would continue to display some of the 
habits they learned as students of Socialist law. The 
fact that he dissented does not contradict the 
expectations stated in Chapter Two as it was noted that 
the role of the Socialist judge on the World Court is 
107 
----- -----· 
dramatically different than her or his role in the 
Socialist state and as such one would expect to see 
dissenting opinions delivered by Socialist judges. 
It was also noted in Chapter Two that a short 
opinion might obscure any evidence of ideological 
predispositions in the opinion of a Socialist judge. 
Kojevnikov supported India's preliminary objections and 
objected to the Court's reasoning on the grounds that 
Portugal did not in 1954 or at any point prior to that 
time have sovereignty over the enclaves. These 
statements are brief and make no reference to a Socialist 
ideology, thus any conclusions drawn from this opinion 
regarding his Marxist-Leninist-mentality would be highly 
speculative. However, one might consider that the 
socialist legal tradition is resentful of what socialists 
perceive as Western imperialism and it places a high 
value on state sovereignty. 
Finally, Spiropoulos submitted a declaration 
testifying to his agreement with Spender, Armand-Ugon, 
and Wellington Koo on the submissions of Portugal on the 
merits. Perhaps Spiropoulos's agreement with what appear 
to be two different types of arguments symbolizes what 
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one would want to conclude from the observations above. 
It appears in this case that even if civil law or common 
law methods of discovering and applying the law can be 
found in the dissenting opinions of a few justices, 
specifically Badawi, Armand-Ugon, Kojevnikov, and 
Winiarski, most of the justices appear to be deciding 
cases according to some other approach. Spender and 
Wellington Koo, although they seemed to have 
predominantly applied common law methods of reasoning, 
appear to have discovered and applied the law in a way 
similar to the majority, combining common law and civil 
law techniques. The only disagreement between the 
opinions of those two, Spender and Wellington Koo, and 
the majority was their interpretation of the facts. 
There is evidence which indicates that the civil law 
dissenters may have employed methods of discovering and 
applying the law traceable to their. legal education, but 
the majority and the common law dissenters appear to be 
adhering to the rules of international law which have 
created for the justices a particular role with 
identifiable constraints. Also, it is more likely that 
Moreno Quintana was motivated in his decision by 
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political convictions rather than legal concerns. 
Finally, it seems reasonable to suppose that the source 
of disagreement between Kojevnikov and Winiarski might be 
attributable to their distinct legal educations since 
both justices represented Socialist states. 
The general conclusion that one must draw from the 
analysis of the Right of Passage Case, then, is that 
legal tradition appears not to have been a variable in 
the decision-making process of most of the judges but may 
have determined, albeit to what degree is unknown, the 
way in which three or four of the dissenters, civil law 
and socialist judges, discovered and applied the law. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ICJ II: THE NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES, JUDGMENT 
(20 February 1969) 305 
Facts and Arguments: 
Prior to submitting their dispute to the ICJ, 
Germany, The Netherlands and Denmark had attempted to 
resolve a disagreement over the delimitations of the 
continental shelf in the North Sea. The Netherlands and 
Denmark insisted that the delimitation was governed by a 
mandatory rule of law which, reflecting the language of 
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, was designated as the 11 equidistance-special 
circumstances rule. 11306 
The effect of this rule is that in the absence of 
agreement by the Parties to employ another method, all 
continental shelf boundaries must be drawn by means of an 
equidistance line, unless or except to the extent to 
which 11 special circumstances 11 are recognized to exist. 
Denmark and The Netherlands stressed that this rule was 
binding on Germany independently of any specific assent, 
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direct or indirect. 307 
The two countries advanced an additional, and more 
abstract argument. They argued that the positive law 
supportive of their position could be augmented by the 
natural law governing delimitation of continental 
shelves. 
The supremacy of the equidistance-special circumstance 
rule could be found, in addition to written agreements, 
through the exercise of reason; it was an a priori and 
necessary rule of delimitation to be applied towards a 
resolution of this dispute.~8 
Germany continually objected to the resolution 
proposed by the other two countries. Instead, it invoked 
the "just and equitable share" principle which allocates 
to the state an amount of the continental shelf in 
proportion to the length of its coastline or sea 
frontage. 309 Germany additionally argued that the nature 
of the shelf created a situation whereby all of the 
countries were entitled to a piece of the central 
portion. 310 
In a joint agreement to submit their dispute to the 
ICJ, the parties asked the Court to answer the following 
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question: "What principles and rules of international 
law are applicable to the delimitations as between the 
parties of the areas of the continental shelf in the 
North Sea which appertain to each of them beyond the 
partial boundary determined by the above-mentioned 
Convention of 1 December 1964? 11311 
Judgment: 
By a vote to 11 to 6 the Court found 
a) the use of the equidistance method for delimitation 
not being obligatory on Pa~ties; 
b) there being no other single method of delimitation 
the use of which is in all circumstances obligatory; 
c) the principles and rule$ to be applied to this 
particular delimitation are as follows: 
1. delimitation is to be effected by agreement in 
accordance with equitable principles, and taking account 
of all the relevant circumstances, in such a way as to 
leave as much as possible to each Party all those parts 
of the continental shelf that constitute a natural 
prolongation of its land territory into and under the 
sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of 
the land territory of the other; 
2. any overlappings are to be divided between them in 
agreed proportions. 
d) in the course of the negotiations, the factors to be 
taken into account are to include: 
1. the general configurations of the coasts of the 
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Parties, as well as the presence of any special or 
unusual features; 
2. the physical and geological structures of the areas 
involved. 
3. the element of a reasonable degree of 
proportionality. 3u 
Majority = M 
Dissent = D 
Separate Opinion = so 
JUDGES-TRADITION 
Rivero - civil 
Koretsky - social 
Fitzmaurice - comm 
Tanaka - comm/civ 
Morelli - civil 
Zaf. Khan - common 
Lachs - civ/com/soc 
P. Nervo - civ/com 
Forster - civil 
Gros - civil 
Ammoun - civil 
Bengzon - civil 
Petren - civil 
Onyeama - common 

















The majority of the Court dismissed Germany's 
request for a delimitation of the North Sea continental 
shelf on the basis of the just and equitable share 
principle. "Delimitation of a continental shelf," the 
judgment read, 11 must be equitably effected, however, it 
114 
cannot have as its object the awarding of an equitable 
share. 11313 Characterizing the just and equitable share 
doctrine as 11 wholly at variance with the most fundamental 
of all the rules of law relating to the continental 
shelf, 11 the Court proceeded to answer Denmark and the 
Netherlands contention: Does the equidistance-special 
circumstance principle constitute a mandatory rule, on 
either a conventional basis or according to customary 
international law?314 
The Court quickly struck down the two states' 
argument based on natural law stating that with regard to 
the relations of states, no obligation is known prior to 
practice. 315 It then turned to the positive law presented 
by the states. After reviewing treaty history, 
discussions of the International Law Commission, 
committees of experts on delimitation, and international 
conferences regarding continental shelf delimitation, the 
Court concluded that the principle of equidistance had at 
no time been regarded as an inherent necessity of 
continental shelf doctrine. 316 
The majority further disagreed with Denmark and the 
Netherlands on their contention that the principle of 
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equidistance had developed into a rule of customary 
international law as a result of its incorporation into 
the Geneva convention. 317 The Court agreed that such 
development can occur but observed that in the case of 
the equidistance principle, no such 11 hardening 11 had taken 
place. The Court pointed out moreover that the Geneva 
Convention had not received a sufficient number of 
ratifications and accessions to characterize it as norm-
creating for all states nor had it been in force long 
enough for what was a principle at its drafting to have 
developed into a rule of law at the time of the dispute. 318 
Composition of the court319 : 
Jose Luis Bustamante y Rivero, (Peru): At the civil law 
universities of Arequipa and Cuczo, Judge Bustamente y 
Rivero studied law and politics, philosophy, history and 
letters. Before entering a career in political office 
which included such positions as Ambassador to Uruguay 
and Minister to Bolivia, Bustamente y Rivero was a 
practicing attorney and served in the Peruvian judiciary. 
He was a member of the ICJ from 1961-1970. 
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Vladimir M. Koretsky, (U.S.S.R.): Judge Koretsky's legal 
career began with a Socialist legal education at the 
Universities of Moscow and Kharkov. From 1920-1949 he 
held a chair at Kharkov and was a member of a number of 
law societies. In the 1940's and 1950's Judge Koretsky 
represented his country on international committees. 
He served as a judge on the ICJ from 1961-1970. 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, (Great Britain): Judge 
Fitzmaurice earned a common law legal education at 
Gonville and Caius College in Cambridge. After 
practicing as a private attorney, Fitzmaurice became 
legal adviser for his country. He represented Britain at 
numerous intern~tional conferences. He was a member of 
the ICJ from 1960-1973. 
Kotaro Tanaka, (Japan): Like other Asian scholars, Judge 
Tanaka was educated in.the law in a number of countries 
and thus, in a number of traditions. He earned his law 
degree from Tokyo Imperial University and subsequently 
~ 
traveled to the common law USA and civil law Europe to do 
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post-graduate work in commercial law. In Japan Tanaka 
became a prolific writer and served as a tutor for the 
Crown Prince and Princess, member of the House of Peers, 
Minister of Education, and Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court. He was a justice at the ICJ from 1961-1970. 
Philip c. Jessup, (U.S.A.): Judge Jessup earned an LL.D 
from Hamilton College, a Ph.D. from Columbia University, 
and LL.B. from Yale University, all common law 
institutions. He was a member of a law firm throughout 
much of his legal career and concurrently taught at 
Columbia and served as Assistant Solicitor at the State 
Department. Jessup represented the U.S. at -many 
international congresses. He served as a judge at the 
ICJ from 1961-1970. 
Gaetano Morelli, (Italy): Judge Morelli earned his Doctor 
of Law in Rome, a civil law country, and for the next 
forty years taught at universities across Italy. He also 
performed diplomatic functions for his native country and 
was a member of many legal societies. He was a member of 
the ICJ from 1961-1970. 
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Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, (Pakistan): Discussed in previous 
Study f p • 9 0 • 
Manfred Lachs, (Poland): Before entering the London 
School of Economics, Judge Lachs studied law in Vienna 
and Nancy at civil law institutions. He remained in 
England throughout World War II and began his 
international legal career there. Once back in Poland 
Judge Lachs became an international representative for 
his country. He served on the ICJ from 1967-1993. 
Luis Padilla Nervo, (Mexico): Although he earned one law 
degree from the University of Mexico, a civil law 
institution, Judge Padilla Nervo earned a second at 
George Washington University, a common law institution. 
He also studied law in Buenos Aires and the London School 
of Economics before embarking on a career as a Mexican 
ambassador and public official. He was a member of the 
ICJ from 1964-1973. 
Isaac Forster, (Senegal): Judge Forster graduated from 
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the Lycee Hoche in Versailles and received a law degree 
from the Paris Law faculty, a civil law institution. 
Most of his career was spent in the Senegalese judiciary; 
however he also served as a representative for his 
country at many international conventions and 
commissions. He was a justice at the ICJ from 1964-1982. 
Andre Gros, (France): Judge Gros earned a civil law 
education at Lyons and Paris Universities. He 
subsequently entered a career in academia, lecturing 
across France, in Argentina, and at The Hague. From 
1947-1963, he held a position in the Legal Department of 
the Foreign Ministry and throughout those years 
represented France at numerous international conferences. 
He was a member of the ICJ from 1964-1984. 
Fouad Ammoun, (Lebanon): After earning a Bachelor of Law 
at Beirut School of Law, Judge Ammoun traveled to Lyon, 
where he earned his Doctor of Law under the civil law 
tradition. He occupied many positions in the Lebanese 
government and judiciary serving as legal adviser, 
ambassador, Secretary-General, and Chairman of.several 
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national, regional, and international committees. He was 
a justice at the ICJ from 1965-1976. 
Cesar Bengzon, (Philippines): Judge Bengzon earned a 
Bachelor of Laws at the University of the Philippines in 
1919. He immediately went to work for the Bureau of 
Justice and eventually became Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court. In addition to teaching law at the 
Philippine universities, Judge Bengzon performed 
diplomatic functions for his government. He was a member 
of the ICJ from 1967-1976. 
Sture Petren, {Sweden): As a student at Lund University, 
Judge Petren earned a civil law degree and a degree in 
the Humanities. The many positions he filled in 
government include but are not limited to Associate Judge 
at the Court of Appeals, Director of Legal Department at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador, legal 
adviser, Professor , and member of International 
commissions. He served on the ICJ from 1967-1976. 
Charles D. Onyeama, (Nigeria): Judge Onyeama's education 
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began in Nigeria where he attended several schools of 
government. He earned his LL.B. at London University and 
studied law at Brasenose College in Oxford, both common 
law institutions. After serving for the Nigerian 
legislature, Judge Onyeama began a career in the 
judiciary where he eventually became Chief Justice of the 
Nigerian Supreme Court. He was a member of the ICJ from 
1967-1976. 
Analysis: 
Again, it appears from the votes that the majority of 
the Court did not discover and apply the law in a way 
reflective of their respective legal traditions. The 
analysis of the judgment supports this observation. Of 
the justices who composed the Court's decision in the 
North Sea Cases, three were educated under the common 
law, three were educated in the civil law and one, Judge 
Padillo Nervo, was educated in both the civil law and 
common law traditions. One common law judge, Jessup, and 
two civil law judges, Bustamante y Rivero and Ammoun, 
delivered separate opinions. 
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The civil law and common law justices representing 
the majority in this case reasoned the legal dispute and 
employed a method of finding the law similar to the Court 
in the Right of Passage Case. Here, as in the earlier 
case, the Court's judgment hinged on state practice and 
other observable factors. In fact the Court quickly 
struck down the natural law argument proposed by Denmark 
and the Netherlands by insisting that there existed no 
legal obligation, known prior to state practice, to use 
the equidistance method of delimitation. 
The Court proceeded to review the positive law on 
delimitation in order to find the law applicable to the 
particular dispute. From an examination of the Truman 
Proclamation, records of the ILC, the conclusions of 
committees of experts on delimitation of continental 
shelves, conferences on delimitation and the history of 
state practice with regard to delimitation, the Court 
found two rules of law that have historically governed 
delimitation. It then instructed the Parties to adhere 
to these particular rules when delimiting the shelf in 
the North Sea. 
The point of contention that occupied much of the 
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Court's time concerned the legal status of Article 6 in 
the Geneva Convention which, Denmark and The Netherlands 
argued, advanced the status of the equidistance method 
from a legal principle to a rule of international law. 
The Court's disagreement with this claim rested wholly on 
its observation of state practice or more accurately, the 
lack thereof, with regard to delimitation based on the 
equidistance principle. More importantly, it refused to 
find customary law in a treaty that, in its opinion, had 
few accessions and ratifications. The Court chose not to 
find international law in a document that, in its 
analysis, was not binding on all states. Thus on the 
matter of the Geneva Convention, the Court put the law-
making authority back into the hands of the states which, 
through their interactions, could advance a non-
obligatory principle of law to an obligatory rule of law. 
Although this self-imposed limitation suggests a 
civil law-like approach to the application of law, one 
can find little or no evidence in this judgment of a 
traditional civil law approach to finding the law. There 
is no discussion or any hints of concern about what 
justice requires or what the "correct" answer to the 
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dispute might be. Moreover, the Court not only bases its 
decision on concrete evidence, but it flatly rejects the 
two abstract arguments it is presented: the argument for 
equidistance based on natural law and the argument for 
equidistance based on its evolution into customary 
international law. Because it was unable to find any 
hard evidence supportive of the claim that the idea of 
equidistance as a rule of law had been accepted by states 
or known to them regardless of their assent, the Court 
subsequently rejected that claim. One cannot infer from 
this observation, however, that the more abstract 
arguments were rejected solely because of the fact of 
abstraction. Rather, what appears to concern the Court 
is the lack of factual evidence to support the abstract 
claims. 
Again, it appears that the Court's decision is more 
reflective of an adherence to rules and principles of 
international law than the practices of a particular 
legal tradition. The majority represents almost equally 
the common law and civil law traditions and the judges' 
discovery and application of the law reflects methods and 
habits from both of the traditions. The judgment 
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manifests the common law's emphasis on facts and the 
creation of law through concrete events yet evinces a 
self-imposed limitation on the part of the justices 
reminiscent of the civil law. The Court's instructions 
for the delimitation appear to be a product of common 
law-like reasoning but fall short of qualifying as a 
pragmatic resolution. The guidelines they set instead 
look more like an outline of the principles to which the 
parties must conform in the process of delimitation. 
None of the separate opinions filed in this case 
represent a sharp divergence from the reasoning of the 
judgment. However one of the four separate opinions does 
seem to lend weight to the proposition that legal 
education and training of the justices determine how they 
discover and apply the law. Whereas the opinions of 
Padillo Nervo, Bustamante y Rivero, and Ammoun do not 
constitute a deviation from t~e majority on the discovery 
or application of the law, Judge Jessup•s opinion appears 
to be representative of the common law tradition. 
Bustamante y Rivero, a judge educated under the civil 
law, submitted a reservation regarding one paragraph in 
the Court's decision wherein a comparison was made 
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between drawing lateral boundaries on an equidistance 
basis for territorial waters and doing the same for 
delimitation of a continental shelf. 320 Bustamante y 
Rivero expressed concern over bringing territorial water 
delimitation into the decision as it is also a 
controversial issue between states and also was not a 
source of the dispute in the present case. 321 
Civil law judge Padillo Nervo chose to append a 
separate opinion for the purposes of further justifying 
the Court's rejection of the argument that Article 6 of 
the Geneva Convention had evolved into customary 
international law. 322 He examined in greater detail the 
principles agreed upon by the Parties to the Geneva 
Convention prior to its drafting and concluded that the 
States at Geneva "did not intend to accept the 
equidistance method as a general rule of law from which 
they could not depart and which would be binding on them 
in all cases. "323 
Judge Ammoun, educated under the civil law, agreed 
with the Court's position that the equidistance principle 
was not opposable as a rule of treaty-law to Germany. 324 
He nonetheless argued that the Parties could employ the 
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equidistance-special circumstances method as derived from 
the general principle of law equity praeter legem. 325 
In an opinion which seemed to be directed more to the 
Parties than to the Court itself, common law judge Jessup 
pointed out that that the real issue underlying the 
dispute over the delimitation of the North Sea involved 
the exploitation of the oil and gas resources. 326 He 
expressed curiosity over why the Parties chose to argue 
on other legal principles which were "sometimes advanced 
with almost academic detachment from realities. 11327 He 
even appeared to be advising the Parties as to how they 
ought to proceed with the negotiations as he discussed 
the possibility of an agreement between the Parties based 
on the principle of joint exploitation of the resources 
in the continental shelf. 328 Lastly, Jessup reminded the 
Parties of their right to return to Court in the event 
that they need further guidance during the process of 
negotiation. 329 
Undoubtedly, Justice Jessup's perception of the role 
of the Court in this dispute was quite different from the 
perception of the majority and Bustamente y Rivero and 
Padillo Nervo. Jessup goes beyond directly answering the 
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question submitted by the Parties and advises them on how 
they might have presented a better argument. He in fact 
informs them that their arguments exclude the real 
problem at hand, division of economic resources, and thus 
miss the point. He offers suggestions about negotiation 
that were not raised by the Parties or the Court and in 
the end extends an invitation to the Parties to return to 
Court if they are unable to reach a resolution. Clearly, 
in this case Jessup views his role on the Court as 
involving more than strict application of the law created 
by states. Indeed Jessup typifies the common law judge; 
he steps outside of the limits imposed on him and the 
other justices by the Parties and proceeds to address 
issues and problems with which he is troubled. Although 
he doesn't appear to be trying to create law in his 
opinion, Jessup does appear to be trying to define for 
the states the dispute between them. He is essentially 
telling the States that they misunderstood the problem or 
at least misrepresented it and that he understands it 
correctly. 
Jessup's common law roots are even more evident in 
his suggestion to the Parties that they consider joint 
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application as a remedy for the problem. He appears to 
be more concerned with a practical, workable solution to 
the problem and is willing to state it in his own opinion 
rather than confine himself to the majority's more vague 
and principled set of instructions. In this case, then, 
Jessup meets the expectations one might have of a common 
law judge on the World Court. He affirms the majority's 
reasoning, which I identified as reflective of common 
law, and subsequently applies the law in a flexible and 
creative manner representative of the common law 
tradition. 
The dissenters were a slightly more diverse group 
then the majority. They included the only judge educated 
under a Socialist system, Koretsky, plus two justices 
educated in· civil law systems, Bengzon and Morelli, and 
one justice, Tanaka, who was educated under the Asian 
legal tradition and both common and civil law. The 
dissenting group also included a justice who represented 
the Socialist state but was educated under the civil law 
and underwent formative training in a common law legal 
system, Manfred Lachs. 
Koretsky proposed a different interpretation of how 
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a principle in international law becomes a rule binding 
upon all states. He argued that the function of 
international conferences and treaty-making is to codify 
principles and rules that have taken shape in state 
practice, in essence it is to express the opinio juris 
regarding particular state practices. 33° Koretsky reasoned 
that the principles and rules embodied in the Geneva 
Convention, including the equidistance-special 
circumstances method, were thus part of customary 
international law and applicable to this dispute. 331 
Finally, he observed that not one of the parties to the 
Geneva Convention opposed in any general way the 
principles and rules embodied in Article 6, although some 
states had reservations about specific geographical 
locations . 332 
One could not conclude that Judge Koretsky discovered 
and applied the law in a manner reflective of the 
Socialist legal tradition under which he was educated. 
His opinion does reveal what one might consider more 
abstract and theoretical concerns, however, as I 
demonstrated in Chapter Two, the civil law tradition is 
equally as concerned with substantive, philosophic 
131 
problems as the Socialist legal tradition. Further 
support for this conclusion lies in Koretsky's lengthy 
and explanatory dissenting opinion which directly 
contradicts the expectations for a Socialist judge laid 
out in Chapter Two. 
The other judge trained in Socialist law, Lachs, came 
to a conclusion similar to Koretsky. Lachs found 
evidence for claim that the equidistance principle had 
become a principle of customary international law 
obligatory on all states in state practice and in the 
fact that it is part of the Geneva Convention and has 
been accepted by the International Law Commission. 333 
Lachs argued that the object and purpose of the Geneva 
Convention, as with all multilateral treaties, limits the 
freedom of states to make reservations to well-
established principles of international law. 334 He 
objected to Germany's claim that if the equidistance 
method applied to this dispute the special circumstances 
rule would have to go into effect because the method 
would allot Germany a lesser portion of the continental 
shelf than the Netherlands and Denmark. Lachs insisted 




In light of his diverse background, it seems that one 
cannot pinpoint which legal tradition, if any, might have 
determined the way in which Lachs discovered and applied 
the law in this case. He is clearly looking at the 
dispute as a matter of legal principle and he worries 
more about the theoretical evolution of law than the 
formation of law as evidenced in state practice. This 
perspective is representative of the civil law tradition 
and the socialist legal tradition which it influenced. 
On the other hand, Lachs does not ignore state practice 
and opinio juris and finds examples of the equidistance 
method being employed by States. This attention to the 
historical facts and the lengthy, assertive dissenting 
opinion reveal Lachs's common law roots. It appears in 
Lachs's case, then, that o'ne cannot know for certain if 
it was the civil law legal education that influenced his 
opinion or his training under the common law and then 
Socialist law. 
One is led to make similar conclusions about Judge 
Tanaka's dissent. Tanaka began by mentioning five 
Agreements between states as examples of the application 
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of the equidistance principle concerning the North Sea 
continental shelf and thus, as evidence for the 
recognition as customary international law this method of 
delimitation on the basis of state practice. 336 He 
proceeded to analyze the process known as customary 
international law, characterizing it as sociological 
process. He acknowledged that the formation of the 
equidistance method as a principle customary 
international law was speedy and attributed this 
speediness to a number of sociological factors including 
the Geneva Convention. 337 He remarked that although it may 
not have been signed by all states, "the coming into 
existence of the Geneva Convention itself would 
psychologically and politically facilitate the adherence 
of the non-party States to the Convention or the 
introduction of the equidistance principle into their 
practice. 11338 Tanaka cited additional factors for his 
position including the urgent necessity of avoiding 
international conflict between coastal states, and the 
fact that a vacuum existed in the law of continental 
shelf that was filled by the Geneva Convention. 339 
Tanaka distinguished between legal positivists and 
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others who see law as existing apart from the states and 
placed himself in the latter category. He stated that 
the essence of law is that it is 11 an objective order vis 
a vis those who are subject to it, and governing above 
them ... 1134° Finally, he admonished the Court for failing 
to take advantage of the opportunity presented to it in 
this case to make a contribution to the progressive 
development of international law. 341 
Tanaka's opinion does not fit neatly into one legal 
tradition. Instead, it embodies methods that one might 
associate with at least two legal traditions. His 
immediate focus on factual evidence is typical of a 
common law approach to discovering law. His critical 
analysis of the theoretical construct known as customary 
international law is characteristic of a civil law 
approach to discovering law. 
The position he takes on the law in opposition to the 
positivist approach might also be considered 
characteristic of a civil law approach to judicial 
decision. However, it might be more reflective of the 
Asian legal tradition under which Tanaka spent most of 
his legal career. Although the Asian legal tradition is 
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not part of the focus in this project, I think it 
appropriate to submit that the idea of law as an 
objective order independent of its subjects is 
fundamental to the Japanese legal order. 342 Moreover, the 
heavy influence of both common law and civil law on the 
Japanese legal system makes a determination about whether 
Tanaka's methods for discovering and applying the law 
were a result of education in civil law and common law 
countries or the outcome of his history as a Japanese 
legal professional very difficult to make. 343 
The final dissenter was Justice Morelli, a civil law 
judge. Morelli disagreed with the Court's rejection of 
the equidistance method as a principle of customary 
international law binding upon Germany for the 
delimitation of the North Sea. His analysis of the 
dispute and of the questions of law at hand was 
representative of the quintessential civil law judge. He 
devoted most of his opinion to an exegesis of the 
principle of equidistance in general and to the 
principles of law governing the delimitation of 
continental shelves. His support of the equidistance 
principle rested on the international legal principle 
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known as contiguity and not on state practice: 
I consider the rule of general international law 
prescribing the equidistance criterion for the 
delimitation of the continental shelve of various 
states to be a necessary consequence of the 
apportionment effected by general international 
law on the basis of contiguity. I am therefore 
of the opinion that it is not necessary to as-
certain if a specific custom has come into exist-
ence in this connection. State practice in this 
field is relevant not as a constitutive element 
of a custom which creates a rule, but rather as 
a confirmation of such rule. Confirmation of 
the rule is also provided, within certain. limits, 
by the provisions of the Geneva Convention. 344 
Morelli argued that written agreements between states 
are only declaratory in character and do no more than 
"record a situation which has already arisen 
automatically." 345 In his search for the law, Morelli did 
not at any point engage in a discussion of the particular 
facts of the delimitation of the North Sea. Instead, he 
sought to access and explain the abstract principles of 
international law existing prior to international 
agreements and state practice in the area of continental 
shelf delimitation. He began with an analysis of the 
rights conferred upon states regarding continental 
shelves and proceeded to deduce to the rule or criterion 
of apportionment known as contiguity. 346 His argument 
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hinged on the logical procession from the notion of 
contiguity to the idea of proximity which led, finally, 
to the principle of equidistance. 347 
Justice Morelli appears to have perceived his role as 
judge as a relatively modest one. He reasoned through 
the problem from a strict theoretical approach and did 
not appear to be attempting to make new law or to be 
directing states to develop better law. He found what he 
believed to be the law by inferring from international 
legal principles; he did not make broad statements about 
how states should or should not be acting nor did he 
pronounce on what the role of international law and the 
Court ought to be. Justice Morelli appears to have 
applied the law in civil law-like fashion. 
The analysis of the votes and decisions in the North 
Sea Cases indicates that, with the exception of perhaps 
two justices, the legal tradition under which a justice 
was educated and trained did not determine the way in 
which he discovered and applied the law in this case. 
The majority was represented, almost equally, by the 
civil and common law traditions, and from the analysis of 
the judgment one is led to conclude that the judges 
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appear to have been guided more by the constraints 
established for them by international law than by the 
legal traditions under which they studied law and became 
legal professionals. 
Of the four individuals who filed separate opinions, 
Justice Jessup, a common law judge from the United 
States, is the only one whose discovery and application 
of the law seemed to reflect the legal tradition under 
which he was educated and trained. Finally, one of the 
dissenting opinions, Justice Morelli's could be 
characterized as highly representative of the legal 
tradition under which its author was educated and 
trained. All of the other dissenters employed methods 
for either discovering or applying the law which were 
typical of the legal tradition under which they were 
educated and/or trained but also employed methods 
characteristic of other legal traditions. 
One might conclude that the opinions of Tanaka and 
Lachs were reflective of their diverse legal experience. 
Recall that these justices had an eclectic legal 
background each having affiliations with three different 
legal traditions. While it might be the case that these 
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justices discovered and applied the law in ways typical 
of their legal background, one should be cautious about 
drawing such a conclusion from this analysis. Since most 
of the other justices employed methods for deciding the 
case that are representative of more than one legal 
tradition, the opinions of Tanaka and Lachs are not 




ICJ III: THE CASE CONCERNING CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN 
NAURU, JUDGMENT (PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS) (JUNE 26, 
1992) 348 
Facts and Arguments: 
The factual point of origin of this case is a 
trusteeship established by the United Nations over the 
now independent state of Nauru located in Micronesia. In 
1947 three states, Australia, the United Kingdom, and New 
Zealand were established as the Administering Authority 
(AA) vested with the authority to exercise the 
administration of Nauru. 349 In 1951 the Nauru Local 
Government Council (NLGC) was created to represent the 
Nauruan community and to perform local administrative 
functions. 350 
According to Nauru, in the following decade and on 
several occasions, the NLGC approached the United Nations 
with concerns about the rehabilitation of phosphate lands 
in Nauru which had been worked-out to near depletion by 
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the British Phosphate Commissioners under the leadership 
of the AA. 351 Specifically, Nauru requested that the 
states composing the AA bear responsibility for financing 
the rehabilitation of the lands. An attempt to resolve 
the issue was made in 1967 with the promulgation of an 
Agreement between the NLGC, on the one hand, and the 
three states of the AA, on the other, by which, according 
to Australia, Nauru waived its claims to rehabilitation 
of the phosphate lands by the states composing the AA. 352 
Ellen Fitzgerald identifies the fundamental legal 
issue in this case as the nature of the trust obligation 
in international law. 353 She argues that the Court, in 
reaching a decision in this case, would be faced with-the 
following questions: What was the character of the 
11 sacred trust 11 in which Australia supervised the social, 
political and economic existence of Nauru until its 
independence in 1968? In examining the nature of the 
trusteeship in general, can one test its potency to 
determine when or how such a trust is violated? What are 
the consequences of such a breach ? 354 Ramon E. Reyes, Jr. 
agrees that the nature of a trust lies at the heart of 
this dispute and comments that this case "raised 
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interesting questions of international law concerning 
accountability for the operations and conduct in a trust 
territory . 11 355 
Antony Anghie finds additional significant legal 
issues framing this dispute. He notes that the case 11 is 
the first instance of a former dependent territory 
bringing action against a metropolitan authority for 
abusing its power when administering the dependent 
territory. 11356 Thus it raises the issue of colonialism. 
Additionally, Anghie observes, the case also presents 
"the stark plight of a people whose verdant island 
home .. has been transformed by mining into a scarred 
wasteland. 11357 Thus, it confronts the Court with the 
question of environmental damage and when and how to 
remedy it . 358 
As this judgment was on the preliminary objections 
and not on the merits, the Court, at this phase, did not 
have to adjudicate on some of these larger legal issues 
identified above. Nauru's claims and Australia's 
objections submitted at this phase were intended to 
address the question of the.Court's jurisdiction and the 
admissibility of Nauru's application. 
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In its pleadings and in oral arguments before the 
Court, Nauru argued that the Agreement did not resolve 
the matter of rehabilitation of the phosphate lands and 
that when the Trusteeship was terminated in 1968 the 
dispute was still unsettled. 359 Nauru asked the Court to 
adjudge and declare that Australia, due to its failure to 
finance the rehabilitation of the worked out phosphate 
lands in Nauru, bears res~onsibility for breaching the 
following obligations: 1) Article 76 the U.N. Charter 
and Articles 3 and 5 the Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru; 
2) the international standards generally recognized as 
applicable in the implementation of the principle of 
self-determination; 3} the obligation to respect the 
right of the Nauruan people to permanent sovereignty over 
their natural wealth and resources; 4) the obligation of 
international law not to exercise powers of 
administration in such a way as to produce a denial of 
justice lato sensu; 5} the obligation of general 
international law not to exercise powers of 
administration in such a way as to constitute an abuse of 
rights; 6) the principle of general international law 
that a State which is responsible for the administration 
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of territory is under an obligation not to bring about 
changes in the condition of the territory which will 
cause irreparable damage to, or substantially prejudice, 
the existing or contingent legal interest of another 
State in respect of that territory.%0 
Nauru requested that the Court find that it has a 
legal entitlement to the Australian allocation of the 
overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners 
which were marshalled and disposed of in accordance with 
the trilateral Agreement rather than shared with the 
Nauruan people.%1 Lastly, it asked the Court to declare 
that Australia was under a duty to make appropriate 
reparation in respect of the loss caused to Nauru as a 
result of the breaches of its legal obligations. 362 
In its defense, Australia advanced preliminary 
objections to the application. First, it invoked its 
reservation to the optional clause excluding from the 
Court's jurisdiction all those disputes between Australia 
and other states which "the parties thereto have agreed 
or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of 
peaceful settlement. " 363 Second, it asserted that Nauru 
had, during debates at the United Nations, waived any 
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claims to rehabilitation of the phosphate lands by 
Australia. 364 Australian officials argued third that their 
government had been discharged of any obligation to 
finance the rehabilitation in Nauru once the Trusteeship 
had been terminated.%5 Fourth, they objected to the 
Court's jurisdiction and inadmissibility of the 
application on grounds that Nauru had allowed an 
unreasonable amount of time to pass before its officials 
filed a complaint with the Court. 366 Fifth, Australia 
argued that Nauru had failed to act in good faith with 
regard to the rehabilitation367 • Sixth, it objected to the 
dispute on grounds that New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom were part of the AA yet were not parties to the 
case and that a judgment by the Court would effect New 
Zealand and the U. K. 368 Lastly, Australia contended that 
Nauru's claim regarding the overseas assets of the BPC 
was a new one. 369 Australia argued that for all of the 
reasons stated above Nauru's application to the Court was 




The Court voted as follows: 
1) 13 to 0 - rejected the preliminary objectio~ based 
on Australia's reservation to the optional 
clause. 
2) 12 to 1 - rejected the preliminary objection based on 
an alleged waiver by Nauru, prior to accession to 
independence, of all claims concerning the rehabilitation 
of the phosphate lands worked out prior to 1 July 1967. 
3) 12 to 1 - rejected the preliminary objection based on 
the termination of the trusteeship over Nauru by the 
United Nations. 
4) 12 to 1 - rejected the preliminary objection based on 
the effect of the passage of time on the admissibility of 
Nauru's application. 
5) 12 to 1 - rejected the preliminary objection based on 
Nauru's alleged lack of good faith. 
6) 9 to 4 - rejected the preliminary objection based on 
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the fact that New Zealand and the United Kingdom were not 
parties to the proceedings. 
7) 13 to 0 - upheld the preliminary objection based on 
the claim concerning the overseas assets of BPC 
being a new one. 
8) 9 to 4 - found that it has jurisdiction and the 
application is admissible. 
9) 13 to 0 - found that the claim regarding overseas 
assets is inadmissible. 370 
Majority = M 
Dissent = D 
Separate Opinion = so 
JUDGES-TRADITION 
Jennings - common 
Oda - common/asian 
Lachs - civ/com/soc 
Ago - civil 
Schwebel - common 
Bedjaoui - civil 
Zhengyu - com/asian 
Evensen - civ/com 
Tarassov - social 
Guillaume - civil 
Shahabudden - comm 
Ranjeva - civil 






























3 4 5 6 
M M M D 
D D D D 
M M M M 
M M M D 
M M M D 
M M M M 
M M M M 
M M M M 
M M M M 
M M M M 
M M M so 
M M M M 





























... _ -- ---·· - --- - -- ...... __ --·- -- ---- - .... --- ---- - . 
This judgment is significantly more one-sided than 
the previous two, i.e. the majority is quite larger in 
this case then in the others I have analyzed. This is 
not an oversight, rather, the cases decided in ICJ III 
thus far have not been as divisive as those in ICJ I and 
ICJ II. In the decisions that have been rendered during 
!CJ III up until the present, the justices have 
overwhelmingly voted together. This judgment represents 
the widest split of votes in this era. 
One might have further noticed that this judgment is 
on the preliminary objections to the case. This is not 
problematic for the purposes of the study as questions of 
jurisdiction at the ICJ are substantive ones rather than 
procedural ones, as they are in municipal law, and thus, 
the justices are making decisions and reasoning about 
substantive law. 
The only notable disagreement between the justices 
in this case was on the matter of the exclusion of New 
Zealand and the U.K. from the case, preliminary 
objections six and eight. The Court refused to uphold 
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these objections stating that it could think of no reason 
for declaring the Application inadmissible on these 
grounds.n1 It noted that in this case the interests of 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom did not constitute the 
very subject-matter of the judgment and that although a 
finding by the Court regarding Australia's responsibility 
concerning the phosphate lands might well have 
implications for the legal situation of New Zealand and 
the U.K., no finding in respect of that legal situation 
would be needed as a basis for the Court's decision. 372 
The Court further noted that states which are not 
part of this case have permission to intervene. 373 The 
Court ruled that the absence of the other states in the 
case, however, "in no way precludes the Court from 
adjudicating upon the claims submitted to it. 11374 The 
Court concluded that "the determination of the 
responsibility of New Zealand or the United Kingdom is 
not a prerequisite for the determination of the 
responsibility of Australia. 11375 
On the first preliminary objection, the Court 
unanimously found Australia's reservation inapplicable to 
the present dispute. Nauru and Australia had not made 
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any agreement to have recourse to some other peaceful 
method of settlement in the event of a dispute over the 
phosphate lands.n6 The Court rejected the second 
preliminary objection, Australia's claim that Nauru had 
waived all claims related to rehabilitation of the 
phosphate lands. It found, through an investigation of 
negotiations for the 1967 Agreement and discussions at 
the United Nations that Nauruan authorities "did not at 
any time effect a clear and unequivocal waiver of their 
claims ..... 377 
After an analysis of discussions between Nauru, the 
states comprising the AA, .and the United Kingdom during 
the process of terminating the trusteeship, the Court 
rejected the third preliminary objection. According to 
the Court, the facts showed that at the time of 
termination of the trusteeship, everyone involved in the 
termination, including the Trusteeship Council in the 
United Nations and representatives in the General 
Assembly, the members of the AA, and the Nauruans, was 
aware of persistent disagreements between the NLGC and 
the AA with regard to the rehabilitation of the phosphate 
lands. 31s And although the General Assembly resolution 
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that terminated the trusteeship did not expressly reserve 
any rights for Nauru with regard to the lands, it also 
did not discharge the AA with respect to such rights. 379 
The Court ruled that "the rights Nauru might have had in 
connection with rehabilitation of the lands remained 
unaffected. u38o 
Australia's fourth preliminary objection, regarding 
the unreasonable passage of time between Nauruan 
independence and the submission of the application to the 
Court, was also rejected. The Court argued that an 
unreasonable passage of time may, in some instances, 
render an application inadmissible. However, since no 
specific time limits have been set for the filing of an 
application with the Court, the Court reasoned, it is the 
responsibility of. the Court to determine, in each 
individual case, if an unreasonable passage of time has 
elapsed so as to render the application inadmissible. 381 
After reviewing the history of correspondence between 
Nauru and Australia with regard to the rehabilitation of 
the phosphate lands, the Court ruled that the application 
was admissible. 382 
The Court readily struck down the fifth objection, 
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alleging a violation of the principle of good faith on 
behalf of Nauru. It noted that Nauru submitted its 
application properly and in accordance with the 
international judicial process and that any further 
judgment regarding good faith would amount to a decision 
on the merits. 383 
Lastly, the Court unanimously upheld Australia's 
seventh and eighth objections wherein it argued that 
Nauru's claim concerning the overseas assets of the 
British Phosphate Commissioners was a new one and thus 
inadmissible. The Court agreed that for a new claim to be 
admissible it must either been implicit in the 
application or it must have arisen directly out of the 
question which is the subject matter. 384 It f~und that 
neither standard was met. The Court's examination of 
Nauru's application showed that no reference to the 
disposal of the overseas assets of the BPC appeared in it 
except for a submission at the end asking the Court to 
declare that it has a legal entitlement to the assets. 385 
The justices also agreed that if they were to include 
this claim on the merits, the subject of the dispute 
would be necessarily altered.~ 
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With the exception of the sixth and eight 
preliminary objections, the only dissents to the six 
questions before the Court were produced by one 
individual, Judge Oda from Japan, who dissented on all 
but three of the votes. 
Com:posi ti on of the court : 387 
Sir Robert Jennings, (United Kingdom): Justice Jennings 
was educated at Downing College, a common law institution 
in Cambridge, before being awarded a fellowship at 
Harvard University, another common law legal facility. 
He remained in academia as a lecturer and published many 
manuscripts on international law. He also served as 
legal adviser to various governments and as counsel in 
numerous arbitrations. Justice Jennings was a member of 
the ICJ from 1982 to 1995. 
Shigeru Oda, (Japan): Judge Oda earned a law degree from 
the University of Tokyo and subsequently spent three 
years studying under a common law system at Yale 
University. In Japan he became a full professor of 
International Law and a diplomat. Judge Oda has been 
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extremely active in the academic community and in the 
international legal community. He has served on the ICJ 
since 1976. 
Manfred Lachs, (Poland): Discussed in previous study, p. 
119. 
Roberto Ago, (Italy): Judge Ago earned a doctorate of law 
and political sciences from the civil law University of 
Naples. He has served as a professor of international 
law at many Italian universities, headed a number of 
Italian delegations to international conferences, and 
served as counsel for various governments in cases before 
the World Court. Judge Ago served on the ICJ from 1979-
1995. 
Stephen M. Schwebel, (United States): Judge Schwebel 
holds a law degree from Yale University but also studied 
the law in Cambridge at Harvard College, both common law 
institutions. He has taught law at Harvard and Cambridge 
Universities, served as legal adviser in the Department 
of State, headed delegations to United Nations 
committees, and authored countless articles on various 
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matters in international law. Judge Schwebel has been a 
member of the ICJ since 1981. 
Mohammed Bedjaoui, {Algeria): Judge Bedjaoui holds a 
Diploma of the Institute of Political Studies at the 
University of Grenoble. Although his official 
bibliography doesn't provide the name of the institution 
where he holds a Doctor of Law, it appears that he earned 
it either at the University of Grenoble or at an 
institution in Algeria. In either case, Bedjaoui was 
educated under the civil law. He has held many posts for 
the Algerian government including Legal Adviser, 
Secretary-General, Minister of Justice and Keeper of the 
Seals, and Ambassador to France. He has been a judge at 
the ICJ since 1982. 
Ni Zhengyu, {China): In China, Judge Zhengyu was educated 
at the Chitz, Soochow and Dongwu Universities. He 
received a Doctorate of Law from a common law school, 
Stanford University. Soon after he began a long tenure as 
Legal Counsel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in 
this capacity represented the PRC at many international 
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conferences. Judge Ni was a member of the ICJ from 1985-
1994. 
Jens Evensen, (Norway): Justice Evensen holds a law 
degree from Oslo University, a civil law institution and 
a Doctorate from Harvard Law School, a common law 
institution. He also studied under the common law system 
at Columbia and Minnesota Law Schools. Evensen was a 
public prosecutor and then a advocate at the Supreme 
Court of Norway. For over a decade he was the Director-
General of the legal Department of the Foreign Ministry. 
He also attended many international conferences on behalf 
of Norway. Judge Evensen served on the ICJ from 1985-
1994. 
Nikolai Konstantinovitch Tarassov, (O.S.S.R. & Russia): 
Tarassov was educated in the law at the Law Faculty of 
Moscow University, a Socialist legal institution. He has 
occupied many positions for the Soviet and Russian 
governments including Consultant to the Legal Department 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Head of the 
Secretariat for the Secretary of the Presidium, 
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Counsellor at the U.S.S.R. embassy in Iran, and 
representative at the United Nations. Judge Tarassov was 
a judge on the ICJ from 1985-1994. 
Gilbert Guillaume, (France): Judge Guillaume received a 
Bachelor's Degree in civil law from the University of 
Paris. He has been a Legal Adviser to France and a 
French representative at many international conferences. 
He was Director of Legal Affairs for France, representing 
the government in many cases, and a professor at the 
University of Paris. Judge Guillaume has been a member 
of the ICJ since 1987. 
Mohamed Shahabuddeen, (Guyana): Judge 
Shahabuddeen studied law at London University, a common 
law facility, where he obtained his LL.D. and Ph.D. In 
Guyana he was Solicitor General and then Attorney 
General. He also served as Minister of Justice and as 
representative of Guyana to many international meetings. 
Judge Shahabuddeen has been a member of the ICJ since 
1988. 
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Andres Aguilar Mawdsley, (Venezuela): Judge Aguilar 
earned a Doctorate in Political and Social Sciences from 
Caracas University, a civil law institution, and a 
Master's Degree in Civil law from McGill University in 
Montreal. For one decade he was a lecturer in Venezualan 
universities but left the academic realm to pursue a 
career as a diplomat for his government. Judge Aguilar 
Mawdsley was on the ICJ from 1991-1995. 
Raymond Ranjeva, (Madagascar): Judge Ranjeva also holds 
degrees from two different countries. In Madagascar he 
obtained a degree in law and administration and a diploma 
in political science and public law. In Paris, a civil 
law state, he earned another diploma in political science 
and public law and also a Doctorate of Law. Ranjeva has 
occupied many positions in academia and government 
including professor, Dean, Rector of the University of 
Antananrivo, delegate at international conferences, and 
counsel for Madagascar in international cases. He has 
been a member of the ICJ since 1991. 
Analysis: 
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It is clear that legal tradition did not determine 
the way in which the justices discovered and applied the 
law in preliminary objections one, seven, and nine. This 
claim is justified by the fact that the Court was 
composed of a fairly diverse group of justices 
representing over five legal traditions and that there 
were no dissents on these votes. 
Once again what stands out in the judgment is a 
method of discovering the law similar to the common law 
approach. In each decision, possibly with the exception 
of the sixth objection, the justices referred to the 
facts leading up to the dispute to make their decision. 
In almost every vote, their decision followed from a 
review of the discussions and correspondence that had 
taken place between Nauru, Australia (and the other 
states of the AA), and members of the bodies of the 
United Nations involved in the trusteeship. 
This common law style is also manifested in the 
decision on the sixth objection involving the 
admissibility of the application in light of New 
Zealand's and the United Kingdom's absence. To 
demonstrate the law on this claim, the Court reviewed 
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past court decisions by the PCIJ and ICJ and national 
courts. Although the Court's deference to previous court 
rulings does not necessarily amount to an acceptance of 
the principle of stare decisis, this method for 
discovering the law is characteristic of the common law 
system founded on the notion of precedent and 
uncharacteristic of the civil law and socialist law 
traditions. 388 
The Court's application of the law does not appear 
to reflect any particular legal tradition, or perhaps 
more accurately it evidences elements of all three of the 
legal traditions examined in Chapter Two with no one of 
them overrepresented.· The judgment does not signal a 
group of powerless, deferential judges looking outward 
for the law, as one might expect from a socialist or 
civil law judge. 
Indeed, in its answer to the question of a reasonable 
time of passage, the Court stated without equivocation 
that it possesses the authority to determine what 
constitutes an unreasonable passage of time. Further, it 
upheld its jurisdiction over the case on the matter of 
the absence of the United Kingdom and New Zealand even 
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though the law surrounding the legal interests of third 
states might be regarded as somewhat vague. 
The Court, on the other hand, does not apply the law 
in traditional common law fashion. There is no evidence 
to suggest that the justices wielded expansive authority 
and created law apart from the law created by states. 
They concerned themselves strictly with the practice 
between Australia and Nauru and refrained from making 
declarations of law which had no basis in state practice 
or international agreements. 
Judge Shahabuddeen filed a separate opinion for the 
purposes of explicating the reasons why he agreed with 
the Court on the sixth preliminary objection. He argued 
that even if one assumed that the obligations under 
question applied to all three of the states comprising 
the AA, the suit could be brought against Australia 
alone (as opposed to a suit against Australia, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom) . 389 He observed that 
Australia had been given the leading role in 
administering Nauru and that it had exclusive authority 
to administer Nauru for all practical purposes. 3~ 
Shahabuddeen dismissed Australia's claim that it did not 
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possess authority over the phosphate industry stating 
that the extent of Australia's authority over Nauru was 
so great as to include the overwhelming bulk of the 
territory's economy. 391 He concluded that the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand had virtually no input into the 
administration of Nauru. 392 
Shahabuddeen referred to statements made by the ILC 
and to municipal law, including the law of torts in 
English Law, and writings of publicists as supportive of 
the position that a state could be sued alone even if it 
shared the obligation at issue with another state or 
states. 393 The judgment, he maintained, only applies to 
the state being sued and does not impose legal 
responsibility on the states absent from the case. 
Shahabuddeen, a common law educated judge, appears 
to have reasoned the problem in a way similar to the 
majority. In fact he clearly states that his opinion 
do~s not diverge from the Court's judgment but 
supplements it and provides further support for its 
conclusions. Like the majority, Shahabuddeen discovers 
the law through an analysis of the facts of the case and 
applies it in a way that is not reflective of one legal 
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tradition in particular. Also like the majority, 
Shahabuddeen's approach to decision-making cannot 
necessarily be attributed to his common law education as 
it was shown that the same approach was taken by civil 
law and Socialist law judges in the Court's judgment. 
Preliminary objections two, three, four, and five 
provide further support for the conclusion that legal 
tradition did not determine the decision-making of the 
majority. One justice, Oda from Japan, dissented on all 
of these four votes plus votes six and eight. An 
analysis of his dissent, however, shows that Oda took the 
same approach to discovering the law as the majority. 
In his decision, Oda was primarily concerned with 
what he perceived to be Nauru's past silence on the 
matter of the rehabilitation of the worked-out phosphate 
lands. He meticulously reviewed all of the facts of the 
case, including all correspondence between Nauru and 
Australia and Nauru and the United Nations regarding the 
rehabilitation of the lands and found that Nauru failed, 
on several crucial occasions, to express to Australia the 
concerns about the financing of the rehabilitation that 
it eventually brought before the Court. 394 Oda agreed with 
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Australia's contention that Nauru waived its claim to 
rehabilitation of the worked-out phosphate lands by 
failing to reserve the claim in the 1967 Agreement 
between the States. 395 He further pointed out that Nauru 
was totally silent on the issue of rehabilitation on the 
date of its independence. 396 This continued silence, Oda 
argued, leads one to the conclusion that Nauru waived the 
claim to rehabilitation of the lands. 397 
Oda upheld Australia's preliminary objection based 
on the passage of time between Nauruan independence and 
its submission of the Application to the Court. Again 
he noted that no claim was put forward when it should 
have been, at the time of Nauruan independence. 398 Oda 
found, through an examination of the facts, that Nauru 
had kept silent on the matter for fifteen years and 
therefore violated the principle of good faith by failing 
to act with due diligence. 399 Oda concluded his decision 
by stating that he hoped Australia will consider 
assisting Nauru in the rehabilitation as the latter is a 
newly independent state and thus in a vulnerable natural 
and social situation.~0 
Oda's meticulous attention to the factual history of 
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the dispute is characteristic of a common law approach to 
discovering the law. This was the preliminary phase of 
the case and the Court wasn't asked to decide on the 
merits, but justices still must determine what law 
governs the dispute and apply it to the dispute to 
determine if the Court has jurisdiction over the dispute. 
Like the majority, Oda looked to the correspondence 
between Nauru and Australia and the United Nations to 
discover whether there was evidence for the claim that 
Australia had breached its international obligations. 
Oda applied the law in a way similar to the 
majority. He did not go beyond the boundaries 
established by international law, as would a traditional 
common law judge, by attempting to create law that did 
not already exist in written agreements or state 
practice. On the other hand, his encouragement to 
Australia to assist Nauru in the rehabilitation of the 
phosphate lands might be regarded as evidence of a common 
law orientation towards judicial decision which 
emphasizes creativity and independent thought. 
It appears that Oda was divided from the majority by 
virtue of the way he interpreted the facts. When he 
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looked at the history of the dispute, he saw something 
very different than what was seen by the rest of the 
Court; where the Court saw Nauru making repeated attempts 
to resolve the disagreement, Oda saw silence. Therefore 
it was in the interpretation of the facts, not the 
importance of them, that led to Oda's dissent. 
By nine votes to four the Court rejected Australia's 
preliminary objection based on the fact that New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom were not parties to the 
proceedings. The dissenters were Jennings, Oda, Ago, and 
Schwebel. Jennings, a common law educated judge from 
Britain, applied the formula from the case of the 
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 401 which limits the 
Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over a case if a 
third state's 11 legal interests would not only be affected 
by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of 
the decision. 11402 Jennings asserted that the legal 
interests of the United Kingdom and New Zealand would 
form the subject matter of any decision in Nauru's case 
against Australia and therefore the Court lacked 
jurisdiction. 403 
Jennings noted that if the Court was to find 
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Australia liable for breaching its international legal 
obligations, an assessment of damages would be made. 
Since New Zealand and the United Kingdom were part of the 
AA and the BPC, he argued, any assessment would clearly 
and unavoidably be a decision in respect of the legal 
interests of the other two states.~4 He reasoned that the 
Court lacked the jurisdiction to make a decision 
affecting the other two states. 405 
Jennings's dissent is typical of the common law 
tradition. He discovered the rule of law in a prior 
court ruling and applied it to the present dispute to 
reach a conclusion about these particular circumstances. 
He mentioned three of the 11 salient instances of the 
inextricable involvement, 11 of the legal interests of the 
United Kingdom and Australia and ruled that these facts 
alone lead to the conclusion that the subject-matter of 
the decision would be formed by the legal interests of 
the two states. 406 
Although one might be able to demonstrate that 
Jennings's discovery of the law was determined by his 
legal education, his application of the law was more 
representative of the civil law tradition. His dissent 
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was very brief and to the point and it lacked any 
evidence that he perceived his role as creative of law. 
It appears that he did not expand his reasoning to 
include his own personal beliefs about the law or this 
particular dispute. 
One must not overlook the fact that Jennings' native 
state, the U.K., had an interest in this case. As the 
United Kingdom was one of the Parties potentially 
affected by the Court's decision, in all likelihood the 
British government would like to have seen the Court 
dismiss the case. Even if this judgment was not directly 
applicable to the United Kingdom or New Zealand, one 
would suppose that if Nauru was victorious at the ICJ, a 
suit against the other two countries might be forthcoming 
and that the judgment against those two states would be 
similar to the one against Australia. 
Some observers might infer from this fact that 
Jennings's opinion was politically motivated. They would 
probably argue that Jennings felt it his duty to uphold 
the interests of the United Kingdom. They might contend, 
moreover that his own political convictions paralleled 
the position of the British government and thus he may 
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have been disallowed from ruling in favor of Nauru. 
However, their claims would be difficult to support as 
Jennings's opinion does not provide any evidence 
indicating that he voted in opposition to the majority 
out of devotion to his government. One would be hard-
pressed to find any statements or insinuations in the 
opinion which would justify such a conclusion. 
The third common law dissenter, Justice Schwebel, 
argued that private law sources and analogies are 
unhelpful in international law where jurisdiction is 
consensual. 4~ Schwebel turned to ICJ cases to determine 
the law on the question of involving New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom in the dispute. Schwebel pointed to his 
dissent in Nicaragua v. U.S. 4~ and to the Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier Dispute409 between El Salvador and 
Honduras as supportive of the principle that if the legal 
interests of a third state will not merely be affected 
but effectively determined by the Court's judgment, the 
Court should not proceed to give judgment in the absence 
of that third state. 410 Looking towards the facts, 
Schwebel found that all of Australia's actions with 
regard to the governance of Nauru were on behalf of the 
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three states collectively. 411 He concluded that a judgment 
-
on Australian responsibility would be a judgment on the 
responsibility of the United Kingdom and New Zealand. 
Judge Schwebel's opinion is a classic example of the 
common law style. Although he disapproves of the Court's 
use of private law sources and analogies, he applies the 
common law method of examining cases to discover the law. 
More significant is the fact that Schwebel chose his own 
dissenting opinion in Nicaragua v. U.S. 412 as supportive of 
his legal position in this case. In the domain of 
international law, cases do not establish precedent, and 
moreover, dissenting opinions are not deemed to be 
creative of law. Schwebel's reference to his own 
dissenting opinion is indicative of a judge who views his 
own decisions, even if they are dissents, as noteworthy 
and as potential rules and principles of law. As I 
pointed out in Chapter Two, in common law systems it is 
not uncommon for dissenting opinions to eventually become 
the law of the land as standards, norms, and ideals 
change. Thus in common law systems, dissenting opinions 
are not only regularly written but are highly valued. 
Schwebel's reliance on his own dissenting opinion in 
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a previous case, an opinion which was incidentally the 
source of much controversy in the international legal 
community, is a clear example of a common law discovery 
and application of the law. Schwebel discovered the law 
through an analysis of the cases and in typical common 
law form displayed independence and authority by 
supplying his own opinion, which was not accepted as 
binding in the first case, as binding in the present 
case. He devoted much time in this dissenting opinion to 
an explanation of his position in the Nicaragua case, 
again evidencing a belief that his independent opinion is 
one that has significant consequences for international 
law. 
It appears in this case, then, that Schwebel 
discovered and applied the law in a manner consistent 
with his legal education and training. His decision 
hinges entirely on terms of past PCIJ and ICJ rulings 
and the facts of this particular dispute. And he expands 
the international judicial role to allow for more 
creativity, authority, and independence. 
The final dissenter, Judge Ago, is an Italian 
educated in the civil law. Ago objected to the Court's 
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decision regarding the absence of the United Kingdom and 
the New Zealand because as he saw it there existed an 
insurmountable contradiction between two facts: l)Nauru 
brought suit against Australia alone and; 2) the task of 
administering Nauru was entrusted to three distinct 
sovereign states. 413 Ago argued that the authority 
conferred by the United Nations was done on the basis of 
the legal equality of the three powers. 414 He conceded 
that Australia may have, as other judges have pointed 
out, discharged more tasks than the other two states but 
argues that this fact can 11 in no way affect the 
fundamental situation of equality of rights and 
obligations between three partners .. 11415 
Ago contended that Nauru had every reason to bring 
action against all three of the states as opposed to 
Australia alone. 416 He pointed out that Nauru chose not to 
sue all of the states and thus reasoned that a ruling by 
the Court on these claims against Australia 11 will, 
inevitably, affect the legal situation of the two other 
states, namely, their rights and obligations. 11417 He 
concluded that a judgment by the Court would deprive it 
of its 11 indispensable consensual basis. 11418 
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Ago's civil law roots are manifest in his repeated 
concern with the rights and obligations of Australia and 
New Zealand. However, he never clearly explicated those 
principles, as would a traditional civil law judge. 
Additionally, he stated at the outset that his argument 
hinges on the existence of two 11 insurmountable 
contradictory facts 11 • It is these facts, he argued, that 
lead him to a conclusion different from the majority. 
Ago's application of the law also fails to conform 
neatly into one legal tradition. His opinion constitutes 
a firm dissent, an exercise discouraged in both the civil 
law and socialist law traditions. However, it doesn't 
evidence the independence, creativity, and authority on 
display in Schwebel's opinion. Ago, like Oda, seems to 
have interpreted the facts in such a way as to come to a 
conclusion in oppositio~ to that of the majority. 
The analysis of this case is similar to the analyses 
of the cases before it: it appears that with the 
exception of two justices, Schwebel and perhaps Jennings, 
the justices did not discover and apply the law in a 
manner consistent with the legal traditions under which 
they were educated. The votes alone represent clear and 
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convincing evidence that legal tradition did not 
determine how the justices discovered and applied the 
law. The analysis provides further support for this 
conclusion. 
One noteworthy observation is the solidarity of the 
judges educated and trained in civil law states. With 
one exception, Ago, they all voted with the majority. 
This observation may not shed much light on the judicial 
decision-making process as the discovery and application 
of the law in the judgment was not reflective of only 
civil law. 
The only two judges on the Court educated and 
trained exclusively in the common law tradition, Jennings 
and Schwebel, dissented from the majority. Both of these 
opinions exhibited definite common law predispositions. 
Jennings appeared to have discovered the law in typical 
common law fashion, through an application of case law, 
but doesn't seem to have adhered to that tradition when 
applying the law. I also noted above that one must 
consider the argument that Jennings's decision was 
dictated by the fact that the United Kingdom had an 
ostensive interest in the case. I attempted to refute 
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this argument by demonstrating that there was no evidence 
to support it. 
Schwebel appears to discover and apply the law in 
quintessential common law style. One might argue that 
his opinion was also the product of political interests 
and that the United States's alliances with the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand dictated Schwebel's 
decision-making. This thesis appears to be refuted, 
however, by Schwebel's previous dissent in the Nicaragua 
case which, he argues, is consistent with his dissent in 
this case. If Schwebel's position is truly consistent, 
then it appears that he may have carved out a legal 
position that was applicable to both cases. 
In the following chapter I will make some 
concluding remarks about the findings from these case 
studies, the controversy over the convergence or 
divergence of the civil and common law traditions, and 
how judicial decision at the World Court may or may not 
shed light on that debate. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
I noted in Chapter One that this project does not 
aim to determine uin what exact proportion" legal 
tradition might influence judicial decision at the 
International Court of Justice. Nor is this thesis an 
effort to detect all of the factors which possibly 
influence an ICJ judge's thinking. Instead, the aim is a 
more modest one. 
Again the purpose of this exercise was to ascertain 
to what extent the legal tradition under which an ICJ 
justice was educated and trained in the law determines 
how she or he decides an international legal dispute. 
The best possible approach to answering this question 
might be to analyze each and every case the ICJ has 
decided in the manner I have done here. However, the 
limitations associated with a thesis project precluded me 
from analyzing nearly 80 court cases. 
This exploratory exercise constitutes a less 
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comprehensive, yet still informative method, of 
discovering whether and to what extent legal tradition 
determines how an ICJ justice finds and applies the law. 
Although I did not examine each and every case decided by 
the Court, the cases analyzed in the foregoing pages are 
the most divisive of the era in which they were decided, 
i.e., they represent the widest split of votes, and thus 
were the most likely cases to reflect differences between 
judicial decisions based on legal tradition. In other 
words these three cases constitute a sample from all of 
the ICJ cases that, when put to analysis, can provide an 
answer to the question of this project without 
prejudicing the outcome of the study. 
The analysis of the Right of Passage case yielded 
little evidence to support the claim that legal tradition 
determines how an ICJ judge finds and applies the law. 
Although there was evidence to indicate that the civil 
law dissenters may have employed methods of discovering 
and applying the law traceable to their legal education 
and that the Socialist judges may have disagreed because 
of their different legal educations, the decision by the 
majority and the opinions of the common law dissenters 
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seemed to be more reflective of the rules of 
international law which have created for the justices a 
particular role with identifiable constraints. Moreno 
Quintana 1 s dissent lent further support to the claim that 
legal tradition was not an important variable in judicial 
decision as his opinion seemed to be motivated by 
political convictions rather than legal rules and 
principles. Thus, if the legal tradition under which an 
ICJ justice was educated and trained mattered to the 
judicial decision-making process in this dispute, it was 
only in the case of four justices: two civil law 
dissenters and two socialist dissenters. 
- The analysis of the decisions in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases produced similar results. Of the 
fifteen permanent justices who contributed to that 
decision, only two, Morelli and Jessup, seemed to find 
and apply the law in a way reflective of the legal 
tradition under which they were educated and trained. 
The rest of the justices appeared to have been guided by 
the rules of international law that have been laid down 
by the states. They found the law through an analysis of 
state practice and kept their function limited to a 
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direct answer to the question asked by the Parties to the 
dispute. 
The same can be said of the Court in the Case of the 
Phosphate Lands in Nauru. Only two of the justices, 
Jennings and Schwebel, appeared to have been discovering 
the law in a fashion typical of their legal tradition, 
the common law. And only one of them, Schwebel, applied 
the law in common law style. The majority, like the 
majorities in the previous two cases, discovered the law 
like common law jurists, looking to concrete facts, but 
applied in traditional civil law fashion, modestly and 
with restraint. 
If these three cases are truly representative of how 
the justices on the ICJ decide cases, then it appears 
that legal tradition plays, at the most, a very minimal 
role in judicial decision-making at the ICJ. In each of 
the cases the majority employed methods from more than 
one legal tradition; thus most of the justices on the 
Court did not find and apply the law in a manner 
reflective of the legal tradition under which they were 
educated and trained. 
Nonetheless, the fact that most of the justices at 
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the ICJ were not influenced by legal tradition in their 
decision does not mean that legal traditions have no 
significance at the World Court. In two of the cases the 
American judge adjudicated in traditional common law 
style. In one case the British judge discovered the law 
as would a common law judge. In two of the cases at 
least one civil law judge employed tactics of legal 
reasoning representative of his legal tradition. And in 
one case the divergence of two Socialist judges might be 
explained by reference to their distinct legal education 
and training. 
The analysis of the three cases at the ICJ leads one 
to conclude that while the legal tradition under which a 
judge is educated and trained may not determine how she 
or he discovers and applies the law in most cases, it may 
in a few cases influence (to what degree is unknown) how 
a judge at the ICJ reasons and delivers a decision. In 
other words, legal tradition may not be a significant 
variable in judicial decision-making, however, one should 
not hastily disregard it in every case as unimportant. 
One might also conclude from the analysis that 
political or national interest is not a significant 
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variable in judicial decision at the !CJ. Only one 
justice in the entire study, Moreno Quintana in the Right 
of Passage Case, evidenced a concern with the political 
implications of his vote and, possibly, voted 
accordingly. I raised the possibility that critics of 
Judge Jennings's vote in the Phosphate Lands Case might 
attribute his decision to national interest, but I also 
noted that his opinion did not substantiate these claims. 
One pattern that stands out in these three cases 
involves the judgments of the majority of the Court. In 
each of these cases the judgment manifests a reliance on 
common law methods for discovering the law and civil law, 
and perhaps socialist law, techniques for applying the 
law. In each of this cases the Court finds the law 
through an interpretation and analysis of the facts of 
the case and, if they exist, state practice and 
international agreements on the legal issue under 
scrutiny. In its search for the law, the Court appears 
to worry less about what justice requires or what, in 
·principle, is the "correct" answer to the problem and 
more about the history of the legal relations between the 
states. 
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On the other hand, the majority in each of these 
cases applies the law in civil law style. There is no 
evidence to support the claim that the majority tried to 
create law or establish international precedent. Nor is 
there any indication in the judgments of a majority that 
perceives itself as highly independent or influential. 
Rather, the majority seems to perceive its role as 
relatively limited. In each of the cases the judgment 
supplies an answer to the question or disagreement posed 
by the Parties; the majority appears to try to restrict 
its reach to those legal issues the Parties ask the Court 
to resolve and which the Court sees as within its 
jurisdiction. 
When one considers the context in which the justices 
at the ICJ are adjudicating legal disputes, this pattern 
on display in their judgments may not be surprising. 
Because international law and international legal 
institutions, like the ICJ, govern states and are created 
and interpreted by states, the World Court faces 
constraints that domestic courts may not. It faces the 
dilemma of trying authoritatively to solve disputes 
between states which have, through the United Nations, 
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created the Court and have the authority to abolish the 
it. If states cherish their sovereignty as much as most 
observers of international politics argue they do, then 
the Court must walk a fine line between upholding 
international law in the face of violations by states and 
respecting the states's right of sovereignty. An 
activist, independent World Court that ignores the 
realities of international politics might effectively 
create its own demise. The Court's emphasis on the 
concrete facts of the case and its unwillingness to 
answer questions not asked of it seems understandable 
then, given its position in the international legal 
structure., 
ARE COMMON LAW & CIVIL LAW REALLY DIFFERENT? 
In Chapter Two I introduced and discussed the debate 
over the convergence and/or divergence of the common law 
and civil law traditions and suggested that the case 
studies might shed light on the debate. It seems that 
the ICJ might be an appropriate context within which to 
draw some limited conclusions about this debate as the 
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World Court is perhaps one of the only tribunals with 
judges from different legal traditions deciding the same 
case. 
Although the judgments of these three cases, if they 
reflect a Court constrained by international law as 
opposed to a Court applying methods from two traditions, 
may not help settle the debate, the breakdown of votes 
might. As we saw in each of the cases, the majority 
represented a combination of civil law and common law 
judges. In none of these cases did the civil law judges 
build a coalition opposed to the common law judges or 
vice-versa; the votes did not fall along lines of legal 
tradition. In all of these cases, civil law and common 
law judges agreed on many questions of law, and in many 
cases, discovered and applied the law in a similar 
manner. 
Still, the few instances of justices appearing to 
have decided a dispute in accordance with their 
respective legal tradition may suggest that the two 
traditions haven't entirely converged. It seems, in 
these opinions, that the methods for discovering and 
applying the law in civil and common law systems have not 
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entirely converged. Jessup and Morelli's opinions in the 
North Sea Cases and Schwebel's opinion in the Phosphate 
Lands Case provide evidence for the claim that the 
differences between common law and civil law legal 
systems persist. Perhaps Schwebel's decision in the 
latter case is more pertinent ·as it is more recent. 
Although I am reluctant to draw any further 
conclusions regarding this debate because of the 
differences between international and domestic law, the 
findings here indicate that one might want to take 
seriously the arguments of those individuals like 
Merryman and Zweigert and Kotz who argue that the common 
law and civil law traditions continue to reveal 
differences while adopting many of the ~ther traditions' 
methods. Their positions are supported by the fact that 
civil law and common law jurists at the ICJ can agree on 
an eclectic method of adjudicating disputes while other 
justices at the World Court continue to rely on methods 
and techniques of discovering and applying the law that 
are characteristic of their respective legal traditions. 
Most justices appear to be able and willing to utilize 
methods from either tradition while others prefer, at 
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least in their decision in these cases, to employ what 
they have learned from their legal education and 
training. 
Are These Findings Important? 
Even though this study did not reveal the 
significant variables involved in judicial decision-
making at the ICJ, it has made a contribution to the body 
of literature on judicial behavior at the ICJ. Indeed, 
if one wants to understand how decisions are made at the 
ICJ, one needs to know how they are not made. Armed with 
the knowledge that certain variables are of less or no 
significance to decision-making at the ICJ, scholars and 
lawyers interested in how members of the ICJ reach 
decisions are that much closer to being able to of fer an 
explanation of th.e Court's judgments. If these 
individuals know that the legal tradition under which a 
justice at the ICJ was educated and trained does not 
determine how she or he will find and apply the law in an 
international legal dispute, then one would expect to see 
that finding reflected in their arguments. Although this 
study rules out legal tradition as a significant variable 
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in decision making at the ICJ, one is left answering the 
question: How do these justices decide the cases brought 
before them? 
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